Rollover by Goodwill: When a Good Rule Has No Teeth

   

A contract changes hands. The work remains, but will the workers? Years of experience can count for little when the next bid promises savings. Brunei wants more people in private employment. What gives them confidence to stay if their family’s future depends on goodwill alone at every change of contractor?

 

Brunei’s oil and gas framework allows employment to continue when contracts change hands, but provides no universal guarantee. For local workers, the next tender can unsettle years of service.

By Malai Hassan Othman

 

11 October 2026

 

The letter began with an apology. “Admin, tolong postkan,” the writer asked, then apologised to anyone who might feel offended. The appeal was for local workers with families to feed.

 

Published on a community Facebook page on 7 October, it was soon shared more widely online, under the heading “Wawasan 2035? Even oil and gas don’t guarantee your future now.”

 

The writer describes themselves as a local contract worker. According to the letter, tenders are still running for contracts beginning in early 2027, leaving existing workers uncertain about their jobs.

 

The writer accepts that companies must control costs. Yet pay, the letter says, has already been adjusted several times. Household commitments do not adjust so easily.

 

The letter lists them: car payments that continue, a planned home now out of reach, and school fees.

 

It also cites a reported move of the Brunei Shell Petroleum (BSP) warehouse to Muara, which would mean longer journeys or a family move.

 

Then comes the line that stays with me. “It is easy for those on high salaries to say ‘Reduce cost’, ‘Meet KPI’, ‘Right sizing’,” the writer says, in words I have translated from Malay. Who looks after the survival of the local worker?

 

According to the letter, workers were told to raise concerns face to face or through grievance channels. The managers they met could not answer, because the uncertainty lay in contracts not yet awarded.

 

The writer’s identity and individual circumstances remain unverified. The wider question deserves scrutiny: when the work passes to another company, what happens to the people doing it?

 

The post that shared it set the letter beside other recent viral claims: lay-offs at contractors, salary cuts, and now no rollover. Then it asked a pointed question: “And what about LBD?” LBD is the Local Business Development framework, the rulebook for local jobs in oil and gas.

 

The comments that followed ranged from anger to resignation. One recalled a time when having a Shell worker as a son-in-law was a family’s pride. Another wrote that oil and gas is no longer the rice bowl career it once was.

 

A third spoke of the prospect of cutting back from rice with meat and vegetables to rice and eggs.

 

The question about LBD deserves more than reassurance. Workers need to know what the framework means for their next job.

 

The work continues but the employer changes

 

Rollover means existing workers move to the contractor taking over the work. It matters because a change of employer need not mean the work itself has gone.

 

The letter alleges that BSP’s new contracts will carry a “No Rollover” condition. That claim needs to be distinguished from the absence of a guaranteed transfer.

 

My understanding from the industry is that BSP encourages rollover, while the successful vendor assesses whether it is feasible. That does not establish the terms of these forthcoming contracts.

 

Contract value matters. Industry sources describe tight pricing on some contracts, with bids at or near cost. Where margins are thin, retaining workers on existing pay becomes harder.

 

Lower-paid recruits may appear cheaper. But experienced workers also bring knowledge of the job, equipment and safety requirements. A retention decision should account for that value.

 

Industry accounts also describe reductions in the work covered by some contracts. Where less work is required, fewer positions may remain, whoever holds the contract.

 

Encouragement from an operator and cost concerns from a contractor can leave workers uncertain about who will decide their future. They need clear terms and timely decisions.

 

BSP and the contractors should tell workers plainly which arrangement applies, what consideration they will receive, and when a decision will come. Families need time to prepare.

 

A contractor taking over a smaller scope may not be able to keep everyone. Where substantially the same work continues, experienced local workers deserve a fair chance to keep doing it.

 

The stakes reach beyond the oilfield. Bruneians are urged to build private-sector careers. That advice is harder to follow when every retender can unsettle both a job and a salary.

 

This uncertainty helps explain the attraction of permanent public-sector employment. Families need a dependable income on which to plan housing, schooling and the years ahead.

 

Online posts also spoke of oil and gas workers seeking agricultural work in Australia. Those accounts do not establish the scale of migration, but they express anxiety about opportunities at home.

 

What the framework provides

 

Directive 2, issued on 1 February 2012 under the Minister of Energy at the Prime Minister’s Office, sets out the LBD framework for the oil and gas industry. Its guidelines followed in April.

 

Under the framework, Core contracts carry local-employment targets of 50 to 90 per cent. Basic contracts carry targets above 90 per cent, with wholly local management.

 

Section 4.7 of the guidelines says specific categories or contracts “may include the rollover of existing Contractor’s personnel”. It links that provision to operational continuity and employment security.

 

The wording permits rollover to be written into contracts; it does not impose a universal requirement. The terms of the particular contract therefore matter.

 

The 2012 guidelines require annual business plans and performance reports three times a year. They specify local-employment numbers, but do not expressly require a separate measure of worker retention.

 

The framework counts heads, not people. Its local-employment percentage may remain intact even as experienced workers lose their jobs. That percentage alone cannot tell the whole story.

 

Wages have a safeguard of their own. The then Energy Department at the Prime Minister’s Office issued Reasonable Wage guidelines for the oil and gas industry, published on BSP’s website. They cover local workers up to National Diploma level in drilling rigs, well services, marine industries and offshore works.

 

Operators must make compliance a contractual term. The directive also says existing basic wages above its threshold, and allowances under those contracts, must not be reduced as a consequence of that directive.

 

But a wage safeguard and a transfer arrangement answer different questions. A worker still needs to know whether the next contractor will offer a job at all, and on what terms.

 

An ambition for growth

 

The framework belongs to a period of ambitious expansion plans. The 2014 Energy White Paper set a target of 50,000 energy-sector jobs by 2035, with 80 per cent held by Bruneians.

 

Expansion creates opportunities to recruit and retain trained people. When work becomes scarcer, a provision that allows rollover leaves workers dependent on the arrangements made for each contract.

 

The pressure described by industry sources makes that distinction more urgent. Retendering can become an occasion to reduce costs, with consequences for both employment and pay.

 

One commenter put the wider point bluntly: “A vision is not a funding strategy.” Wawasan 2035 was meant to leave the country less exposed to exactly this moment.

 

The government knows where the jobs are lost. On 7 August 2025, Legislative Council member Awang Haji Salleh Bostaman bin Haji Zainal Abidin asked how experienced locals are protected during right-sizing.

 

The minister’s answer said upstream job losses mostly involved contracts not renewed or ending after projects, alongside operational adjustments. It cited Bruneianisation, LBD measures and screening of foreign-worker applications.

 

It also described succession planning and help with finding work across sectors. Those measures matter. None guarantees a transfer when the contractor changes, which is exactly the moment the letter describes.

 

Three practical changes

 

The existing framework offers a starting point. The Department of Energy, operators and contractors should review how employment continuity is handled in tendering and identify what further provisions are needed.

 

First, give credible workforce-retention plans explicit weight in tender evaluation, alongside competence, safety and cost. A cheaper bid should have to explain what it will do with the people already doing the work.

 

Second, require successor contractors to give qualified existing local workers first consideration for continuing roles, with any changes to pay, duties or location made clear before acceptance.

 

First consideration alone will not stop falling pay. It needs transparent terms and enough notice for workers to judge what an offer means for their families.

 

Third, report retention outcomes alongside local headcounts: how many existing workers received offers, how many accepted, and how many were displaced. Aggregate figures would show the transition without naming anyone.

 

These measures would not save every job. They would make those managing a transition account for what happens to the people when the work itself continues.

 

The letter alone establishes neither a breach nor compliance. The policy question remains: how should the framework protect experienced local workers when their work passes to another contractor?

 

The writer’s concern is plain enough: years of work should count for something when the contract changes hands.

 

Goodwill can help a worker through a change of contractor. It is a fragile basis on which to plan a family’s future. The rules should carry more of that weight.

A Yellow Press Card and the Fading Promise of Globalisation

A yellow press card recalls 1998, when globalisation promised prosperity. Today, tariffs, China's rise and the Gulf crisis challenge that promise. Brunei embraced free trade, yet remains dependent on oil and gas. Can a small nation prosper in an increasingly protectionist world without first strengthening its economy at home?

 

In London in 1998, Asia and Europe pledged to resist protectionism. Twenty-eight years later, tariffs, China's rise and war in the Gulf are testing whether that promise still holds.

By Malai Hassan Othman
KopiTalk with MHO | 11 October 2026

An old yellow press card turned up among my belongings recently. It carried my photograph, my name, the Borneo Bulletin and an assignment I had not thought about in years.

The card was issued for the Second Asia-Europe Meeting, or ASEM 2, held in London on 3–4 April 1998. I was 41, one of the accredited correspondents covering the summit.

The face in the photograph belongs to a younger reporter. He was there to record a summit at which Asia and Europe pledged to keep their markets open while much of Asia was in deep economic trouble.

Twenty-eight years later, that promise is under strain. Washington has made tariffs a central tool of policy. China has become an economic superpower. War in the Gulf has put ships and energy supplies at risk.

The world is still trading. What has weakened is the confidence that open markets would, by themselves, deliver security and prosperity.

When the world was opening up

The 1990s were years of great expectations. The Cold War had ended, and governments were seeking new economic partnerships in a changing international order.

The World Trade Organisation (WTO) came into being in 1995. Trade liberalisation, foreign investment and international cooperation filled political speeches across Asia and Europe.

In Brunei, ministers and senior officials of the period often reached for one phrase: “Think Global, Act Local”. It was never an official national slogan, but it captured much of the thinking at the time.

We were a small country, increasingly aware that our economic future would be shaped by developments far beyond our shores. Globalisation promised markets, investment, technology and opportunities to participate in international production networks.

There were warnings too. Critics questioned whether the benefits would be shared fairly and whether smaller economies could withstand international shocks. But the prevailing direction was towards openness.

ASEM grew out of that climate. Singapore championed closer relations between Asia and Europe, leading to the inaugural summit in Bangkok in March 1996.

The idea was straightforward. Ties across the Atlantic and Pacific were already well established. The relationship between Asia and Europe was seen as the missing side of the triangle.

By the time leaders met again in London two years later, much of Asia was in crisis.

I travelled to London on assignment for the Borneo Bulletin. Memory keeps less than a press card does, and I will not pretend to recall every briefing. The record of what the leaders decided, however, is clear.

British Prime Minister Tony Blair chaired the meeting. Leaders from ten Asian and fifteen European countries attended, together with the President of the European Commission.

Brunei Darussalam was represented by His Majesty Paduka Seri Baginda Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Mu’izzaddin Waddaulah ibni Al-Marhum Sultan Haji Omar ’Ali Saifuddien Sa’adul Khairi Waddien, Sultan and Yang Di-Pertuan of Brunei Darussalam.

The Asian financial crisis, which began in Thailand in July 1997, hung over the summit. Currencies had collapsed, companies were failing, and public confidence had been badly shaken.

Economic interdependence, praised as a source of opportunity, had demonstrated how quickly financial trouble could cross borders. The temptation was to retreat behind national barriers.

London chose another course.

ASEM leaders agreed to resist protectionist pressures and maintain open markets. Their trade and investment pledge committed them, at a minimum, not to make market access more restrictive than existing levels.

The commitment was accompanied by practical initiatives. Leaders adopted plans to facilitate trade and promote investment, while welcoming an ASEM Trust Fund administered by the World Bank to support financial-sector restructuring and measures addressing the social consequences of the crisis.

These commitments were recorded in the summit's official statements. The message was that economic difficulty called for cooperation rather than withdrawal from international trade.

For a reporter from Brunei, there was another lesson. Our country was represented alongside Britain, France, Germany, China and Japan in discussions affecting the international economy.

Size did not exclude Brunei from participation. International cooperation offered smaller nations opportunities to be heard on matters that could shape their future.

That principle remains important today.

When open markets meet national interests

Brunei did more than participate in international discussions. It also became involved in shaping regional trade arrangements.

In 2005, Brunei joined Chile, New Zealand and Singapore in signing the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership, commonly known as the P4 agreement.

Four relatively small, open economies sought to demonstrate what a wider commitment to trade liberalisation could achieve.

The P4 helped lay the groundwork for the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations. Following Washington's withdrawal in 2017, the remaining participants concluded the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).

Brunei is also a party to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which entered into force in 2022 and connects ASEAN with China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.

These agreements reflect Brunei's longstanding commitment to international economic cooperation.

They also underscore what is at stake when trade rules become less predictable.

The United States helped shape the post-war international trading system. Today, it has increasingly turned to tariffs, industrial subsidies and restrictions on strategic technologies.

Under President Donald Trump, tariffs have again become a central instrument of American economic policy, affecting competitors and longstanding trading partners alike.

Washington argues that such measures can protect domestic industries, address unfair competition and reduce dependence on foreign suppliers in strategically important sectors.

Those concerns deserve examination. Open trade has not always delivered equal benefits, and governments face genuine questions about industrial competitiveness and national security.

For trading partners, however, higher barriers create uncertainty. Businesses must reconsider supply chains, investment decisions and market access when trade rules can change abruptly.

China's emergence has complicated the picture further.

When I covered ASEM 2, China was still more than three years away from joining the WTO. Today, it is a leading manufacturing, trading and technological power.

Its economic transformation has created substantial opportunities for international commerce. It has also intensified competition over manufacturing capacity, advanced technologies, subsidies and critical minerals.

Washington and Beijing increasingly treat parts of their economic relationship as matters of national security. Both seek the benefits of international markets while protecting industries they consider strategically important.

The vocabulary has changed accordingly.

Where governments once spoke enthusiastically about removing barriers, they now emphasise resilience, self-reliance, economic security and reducing dependence on particular suppliers.

Every government has a responsibility to safeguard its national interests. The difficulty arises when restrictions accumulate across major economies, weakening the predictability on which international trade depends.

The danger is not that free trade has disappeared. It is that openness is increasingly conditional on political and strategic calculations.

Another Gulf crisis, another test

The Gulf has a way of marking turning points in the international order.

ASEM was established in the years following the 1990–1991 Gulf War, amid the broader changes that followed the end of the Cold War. Economic integration was becoming an important feature of international policy.

The earlier war was not the reason ASEM was created. But it formed part of the geopolitical landscape from which a more interconnected economic order emerged.

Today, another Gulf crisis is testing the resilience of that order.

The conflict involving Iran, the United States and Israel has threatened commercial shipping around the Strait of Hormuz, placing vessels, crews and energy supplies at risk.

This is a different kind of threat from tariffs.

Governments can negotiate market access or reduce import duties. Those agreements provide limited protection when commercial vessels cannot pass safely through a vital shipping route.

International trade depends on more than favourable rules. It requires secure sea lanes, reliable transport, functioning supply chains and confidence that goods can reach their destinations.

Energy markets have been particularly exposed.

According to the WTO's Global Trade Outlook released on 8 October 2026, crude oil exports from the Middle East fell by approximately 24 per cent in the first half of the year. Liquefied natural gas exports from the region declined by 47 per cent.

Those figures describe regional exports, not global supply. Increased shipments from other producers helped cushion the worldwide impact.

Nevertheless, higher energy, freight and fertiliser costs can travel far beyond the conflict zone, affecting factories, farms, businesses and household budgets thousands of kilometres away.

Yet global trade has proved more resilient than many expected.

On 8 October, the WTO raised its forecast for world merchandise trade growth in 2026 to 3.9 per cent by volume, compared with its earlier projection of 1.9 per cent.

A significant contribution came from investment in artificial intelligence. According to the WTO, goods associated with AI infrastructure, including semiconductors and servers, accounted for 47 per cent of the increase in the value of global merchandise trade during the first half of 2026.

The distinction matters. Trade growth measured by value is not the same as growth measured by volume.

The figures also tell a more complicated story than one of globalisation simply going into reverse.

International supply chains have adapted to disruptions. Trade continues, and new technologies are creating demand across borders.

Economic interdependence remains powerful. What is increasingly uncertain is whether governments can preserve the rules and security arrangements that allow it to function.

Where does Brunei stand?

For Brunei, these developments raise questions extending beyond the daily movement of oil and gas prices.

As an energy exporter, Brunei may benefit from higher international prices under certain conditions. But temporary price gains cannot substitute for sustained economic diversification.

Wawasan Brunei 2035 sets out the ambition of building a dynamic and sustainable economy. Nearly two decades after its introduction, hydrocarbons remain central to the country's exports and government revenue.

That dependence deserves attention, particularly when external events temporarily improve energy earnings.

A rise in oil and gas prices can strengthen revenue in the short term without necessarily indicating progress towards a more diversified economic structure.

Food security presents another exposure.

The Department of Agriculture and Agrifood's 2024 statistics recorded Brunei's rice self-sufficiency at 7.55 per cent, meaning that more than nine-tenths of consumption depended on imports.

That figure illustrates the country's exposure to international supply conditions. Even where food shipments do not pass through the Strait of Hormuz, higher energy, transport and agricultural input costs can influence import prices.

Brunei cannot determine the trade policies of Washington, Beijing or Brussels. Nor can it resolve a conflict threatening a major international shipping route.

What it can do is strengthen its capacity to withstand external shocks.

That brings me back to the familiar expression of the 1990s: Think Global, Act Local.

Brunei embraced the global dimension through international agreements, diplomatic engagement and participation in regional economic partnerships.

The more demanding question concerns the local results.

To what extent have these arrangements helped Bruneian businesses enter new markets, develop competitive products, attract productive investment and create skilled employment?

How much progress has been made in building export industries beyond oil and gas?

These questions should be answered through measurable outcomes rather than the number of agreements signed or meetings attended.

For smaller economies, a predictable rules-based trading system provides an important safeguard against a world in which economic relationships are determined mainly by bargaining power.

That is why institutions such as the WTO and dialogue forums such as ASEM continue to matter.

ASEM has expanded from 26 founding partners to 53, with cooperation extending across political, economic, educational and cultural fields.

Its continued existence demonstrates a willingness to maintain dialogue. But dialogue alone cannot establish whether the partnership is meeting the expectations that accompanied its creation.

The more difficult test is whether its members can use that relationship to preserve cooperation, manage disagreements and defend predictable international trade.

For Brunei, international engagement should also produce benefits visible beyond the conference hall: investment, skills, market access and partnerships that strengthen industries at home.

A promise worth remembering

I look at the yellow press card with nostalgia, and with some unease.

It belongs to a time when an overseas assignment meant a notebook, a deadline and the duty to explain distant events to readers back home.

Globalisation was never a guarantee of peace or prosperity. Its benefits depended on governments respecting agreed rules, honouring commitments and maintaining sufficient trust to keep markets open.

My press card has survived 28 years. The pledge it witnessed has had a harder life.

In 1998, the question was how to bring economies closer together. In 2026, it is whether governments still have the will to keep them connected.

 

 

Two Flames on the Borneo Coast

   

For half a century, Lumut has helped sustain Brunei’s prosperity. Now, a larger neighbour competes for Asian buyers while regional partnerships promise fresh gas. His Majesty has called for a clear path. Can Brunei turn today’s market opportunity into lasting strength—or will higher prices merely buy a little time?

 

The Gulf War has made Borneo gas strategic. Brunei must now compete with Sarawak and depend on Malaysia at the same time

Geopolitik | 10 October 2026

By Malai Hassan Othman

Since March, a war in the Gulf has redrawn the map of Asian energy security. Brunei sits on the right side of that map, but on a coastline it shares with a far larger supplier.

Iranian attacks on Qatar’s Ras Laffan complex in March damaged two liquefied natural gas (LNG) trains that may take three years to repair. QatarEnergy is now producing very little LNG.

Asian spot LNG for October delivery reached US$27 per million British thermal units in September, a 45-month high. Buyers are paying a premium for gas that avoids the Strait of Hormuz.

Cargoes from Borneo reach Japan, Korea, China and Thailand without crossing Hormuz or the Strait of Malacca. In this crisis, geography has become a commercial asset.

But Borneo has two LNG sellers. Brunei’s plant at Lumut and Malaysia’s complex at Bintulu, in Sarawak, are courting the same anxious buyers at the same moment.

It is against this backdrop that two titah, delivered on consecutive days, deserve a second reading.

On 30 September, His Majesty Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Mu’izzaddin Waddaulah ibni Al-Marhum Sultan Haji Omar ‘Ali Saifuddien Sa’adul Khairi Waddien, Sultan and Yang Di-Pertuan of Brunei Darussalam, chaired the board meetings of Brunei LNG and Brunei Gas Carriers.

The Prime Minister’s Office reported that His Majesty emphasised a clear path towards each company’s potential and the strategic choices needed for long-term competitiveness.

The following day, chairing the Brunei Shell Petroleum (BSP) and Brunei Shell Marketing boards, His Majesty emphasised safety, performance and closer collaboration across the Brunei Shell Joint Venture companies.

Read against the Gulf crisis, the message is timely. A window has opened for Brunei’s gas. The question is whether Brunei can make full use of it before it narrows.

An old plant in a wartime market

Brunei LNG’s plant at Lumut started in 1972, the first LNG export plant in the western Pacific. It is now the longest-running LNG plant in the world.

The company lists five liquefaction trains and up to 7.7 million tonnes of LNG a year. The Government holds 50 per cent, with Shell and Mitsubishi Corporation holding 25 per cent each.

Gas for processing comes from BSP and the Block B joint venture. Actual output depends on the gas available, on maintenance and on operating reliability, not on installed capacity alone.

Buyers have taken notice. Brunei LNG signed a long-term agreement with Japan’s JAPEX on 31 August 2026, following a second deal with Thailand’s PTT in June and one with PetroChina in 2025.

Higher spot prices, however, cannot be read directly as higher earnings for every Brunei cargo. Contract prices are confidential, and a temporary shortage cannot be assumed to support favourable terms for decades.

The gas comes through Malaysia

Brunei’s future supply carries a geopolitical story of its own. An important part will come from Block CA2, in waters whose development was settled through diplomacy with Malaysia.

In March 2009, Brunei and Malaysia signed the Exchange of Letters. Among its key provisions was a Commercial Arrangement Area for joint oil and gas development, and a mechanism for fields straddling both countries’ waters.

In 2010, Petronas and Brunei’s national petroleum company signed a production sharing agreement for Blocks CA1 and CA2. Petronas became the main operator, and CA2 gas was earmarked for Lumut.

That plan is finally becoming real. Mitsubishi Corporation, which holds 18.75 per cent of the project, announced its final investment decision on 7 November 2025.

Mitsubishi targets commercial production around 2030, at about 390 million standard cubic feet of gas a day. Petronas Carigali Brunei has leased a floating production unit from Malaysia’s MISC, designed to process 450 million.

Consider the irony. The plant competing with Sarawak for Asian buyers will run partly on gas from a Petronas-operated field, processed on a Malaysian-owned floating unit.

This is not a weakness in itself. Interdependence between good neighbours can be a source of stability. But it does mean Brunei’s LNG future is partly negotiated, not simply owned.

There is also a timing problem. The Gulf window is open now, in 2026 and 2027. CA2 gas arrives around 2030. Brunei must win and keep buyers with the gas it has today.

The giant down the coast

Petronas lists nine production trains and 29.3 million tonnes of annual capacity at Bintulu. On the published figures, that is nearly four times Lumut’s capacity.

Its trains are also younger, built in stages from 1983 to 2016. Behind them sits Sarawak, which holds about 60 per cent of Malaysia’s gas reserves, according to research house BMI.

That scale allows costs to be spread across greater volumes. The advantage still depends on how well the plant uses its capacity, controls energy costs and avoids outages.

Sarawak is also changing politically. Since 2024, its state oil company, Petroleum Sarawak Berhad (Petros), has asserted the role of sole gas aggregator within the state.

In May 2025, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim and Sarawak Premier Abang Johari signed a joint declaration. Petronas keeps its upstream role, Petros leads domestic gas supply, and existing LNG export agreements stand.

Part of Sarawak’s gas roadmap is a gas hub at Miri, just across our western border. Brunei’s neighbour is no longer one voice in Putrajaya, but two, with Kuching speaking for its own gas.

For Brunei, this matters. Any future cross-border gas arrangement, including fields that straddle the boundary, may now need to satisfy Kuching as well as Putrajaya.

Competition with Bintulu is real, but it is not zero-sum. In a crisis, buyers want more suppliers, not fewer. A contract for Bintulu need not mean a lost customer for Lumut.

The window and its clock

The Gulf window will not stay open forever. Reuters reported on 7 October that Qatar’s first North Field East expansion train could begin LNG production in the first quarter of 2027.

A sustained ramp-up, analysts say, still requires unrestricted passage through Hormuz. QatarEnergy has said normal operations could resume within weeks once the strait reopens.

Brunei should pursue the openings available today while preparing for the return of Gulf supply. The premium on Borneo gas may fade well before CA2 produces its first cargo.

There is also a moral dimension. Brunei has friends in the Gulf as well as customers in North-east Asia. Its true interest lies in an early end to the conflict, not in profiting from it.

What clearer choices require

Closer collaboration across the joint ventures could help coordinate maintenance, share expertise and improve planning. The test will be safer operations, fewer disruptions and stronger financial results.

Efficiency must not come at the cost of dependable delivery. A cheaper operation that suffers avoidable outages would undermine the very reputation on which a long-term supplier depends.

Workforce development also featured in the board discussions. Retaining experienced staff and preparing Bruneian technical workers will sustain the knowledge on which Lumut’s future depends.

Brunei must also decide how much investment Lumut needs for the CA2 era. That requires evidence on equipment condition, maintenance costs and expected gas supply, not on the plant’s age alone.

Processing additional regional gas for a fee may warrant a feasibility study. It would need spare capacity at Lumut and trust across three capitals: Bandar Seri Begawan, Putrajaya and Kuching.

The 2009 Exchange of Letters shows such trust can be built. It turned a difficult boundary question into a shared commercial arrangement that now feeds Lumut’s future.

The stakes are national. Oil and gas made up 45.1 per cent of Brunei’s gross domestic product in the first quarter of 2026, at current prices.

Commercial negotiations require confidentiality. Even so, Bruneians can reasonably expect an explanation of the broad direction, major milestones and national benefits of these investments.

For more than half a century, Lumut has helped sustain Brunei’s prosperity. Bintulu’s scale now reminds us that experience must be backed by investment, secure gas and disciplined execution.

The Gulf war has made Borneo gas strategic. His Majesty’s call for a clear path points to the longer task: keeping Lumut competitive, with Malaysia as both rival and partner, after the crisis passes.

KOPITALK WITH MHO

His Majesty has turned the national youth theme from readiness to leadership. The agencies that serve young people have been shown where the work lies.

 By Malai Hassan Othman

For seven years, National Youth Day carried one theme: Belia Siaga Masa Depan, or Future-Ready Youth. On 8 October 2026, at the International Convention Centre, that changed.

His Majesty Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Mu’izzaddin Waddaulah ibni Al-Marhum Sultan Haji Omar ‘Ali Saifuddien Sa’adul Khairi Waddien, Sultan and Yang Di-Pertuan of Brunei Darussalam, told the 21st National Youth Day celebration that the choice of a new theme this year was his own.

It is Belia Peneraju Negara, or Youth Leading the Nation. His Majesty said the theme suits the role of youth as the pulse of development.

For more than two decades, the country has raised its expectations of the young one step at a time.

The first National Youth Policy came in 2002. National Youth Day followed in 2006.

National service, the Program Khidmat Bakti Negara (PKBN), began as a pilot in December 2011. In December 2020 the youth policy was revised to run to 2035.

Each step asked a little more of young Bruneians. This year’s theme asks the most.

The two themes differ in tense. Ready is something a person becomes for later. Leading is done now, in front of other people.

That raises a practical question: where can young people exercise that leadership?

A theme His Majesty chose himself sets a standard. For agencies with youth in their mandate, it is a reason to look hard at the opportunities they provide.

His Majesty also called on youth to seize opportunities, use technology and help drive a progressive, resilient economy. By that measure, leadership reaches into working life.

The number, and what sits beneath it

His Majesty said he was glad to learn that the Youth Development Index rose from 65.1 in 2018 to 69.0 in 2025, the highest since the index began in 2008.

Two areas drove the rise, the titah said: Values and Identities, and Education. On identity and schooling, the numbers are moving the right way.

The titah then named the areas that still need strengthening: community engagement and financial literacy among youth. Effort on both, His Majesty said, must be continuous.

Education and job opportunities must also keep being strengthened, His Majesty added, so that youth development is carried out in a balanced way.

The areas needing attention were named from the national stage, in the same breath as the record score.

Set the new theme beside those two areas and the connection is clear. Leadership is practised in the community: in the kampung, on the mosque committee, in the youth association.

Leading also takes money sense. A young person handling a first salary or a first loan learns quickly whether independence begins there or stalls.

Whose desk

His Majesty welcomed the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports’ work to review the National Youth Policy and Strategy, known by its Malay initials DBNS.

His Majesty advised that the review draw on the latest index findings and take account of changes in the economy, in technology and in what young people need.

The next index will show whether those two scores have moved. What it cannot show is how much responsibility young people were given.

The scores for community engagement and financial literacy deserve the widest circulation, each with a target and a date for reporting progress.

Young people would also want to know when the reviewed policy will be ready, and how their own voices are being gathered while it is written.

On volunteerism, the titah named the partners: youth, educational institutions, the Mukim and Village Consultative Councils, and other community groups. Their cooperation, His Majesty said, is very important.

The councils work close to the ground. Two figures would say much: how many young people sit on them, and how many council projects young people lead.

Financial literacy crosses several desks: schools, banks, the Brunei Darussalam Central Bank, employers. A task shared that widely needs one desk that answers for it.

The titah’s line on job opportunities is brief. The agencies that plan manpower and match jobseekers hold the figures that will show whether a generation asked to lead has somewhere to do it.

Six months

His Majesty took note that the PKBN pilot now runs for six months, up from three.

It carries two new modules: Siap Siaga Masa Depan, on readiness for the future, and a Civil Defence Programme.

His Majesty advised that the pilot’s effectiveness be evaluated thoroughly, so that PKBN has a real effect on the identity and discipline of youth. His Majesty also called on more young people to join.

For the organisers, that points to an assessment whose measures are known early and whose findings reach participants and their families.

Practical skills would strengthen the case for joining. A certificate helps. A skill an employer recognises helps more.

The gaps have been named. A young Bruneian is twenty only once.

The Elders Help Has Yet to Reach

At 78, a man who served his district for nearly thirty years has lost his pension and free medical care. Assistance channels exist. He did not know where to ask. When welfare moves online, who finds those without the means or skills to apply? We found him while planning tourism.

 

A 78-year-old in a Temburong longhouse has lost his pension and his free medical care. Assistance channels exist, but he did not know where to ask.

 

By Malai Hassan Othman

We went to Temburong to prepare a day trip. The National Development Party, whose advisory board I chair, plans to bring visitors from Belait as a small contribution to Brunei Visit Year 2027.

 

During the visit, we called on party members at Rumah Panjang Sumbiling Baharu and spent time talking with residents, among them the elders of the longhouse.

 

One issue caught our attention: medical care for permanent residents who hold foreign passports.

 

One of the elders is 78. I will not name him. His wife and children are Brunei citizens. He is a permanent resident with a foreign passport.

 

He told us he worked at the Temburong District Office for almost thirty years, paid by the day. After he retired, he received the $250 monthly old-age pension.

 

He no longer receives it, and his treatment at government clinics is no longer free. He depends on his family to support him.

 

He asked whether any help was available to a man in his position. He did not know there was anywhere to ask.

 

He said his friends face the same difficulty, and he put their number in Temburong at about 800. That is his estimate, not a verified count. It is unclear precisely whom it includes.

 

Two decisions, four years apart

 

The pension went first. From 1 October 2021, the old-age pension was limited to citizens and stateless permanent residents under an amended Old Age and Disability Pensions Act.

 

The Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports said then that more than 2,000 permanent residents holding foreign citizenship would stop receiving it.

 

Free medical care went second. Since 1 July 2025, permanent residents with foreign nationality and the foreign spouses of citizens have generally been required to pay for treatment at government hospitals, subject to exemptions.

 

Dato Dr Haji Mohd Isham Haji Jaafar, speaking as Minister of Health that month, said the government had spent close to $70 million in a year on their care.

 

He said the ministry's budget had grown from $391 million to more than $652 million in three years, and he cited cases of people marrying citizens to obtain cancer treatment.

 

I do not quarrel with the arithmetic. A small country cannot carry every cost indefinitely, and abuse of that kind deserves a closed door.

 

A man of 78 who served a district office for almost thirty years is a different case.

 

The general charging policy distinguishes by nationality. Long residence and public service do not, in themselves, secure the exemption he previously enjoyed.

 

Help that waits to be asked

 

The Ministry of Health did leave a door open. Patients facing difficulty paying can be assessed by medical social workers and the ministry’s finance division.

 

Help may then come from the Patients' Relief Fund, the Brunei Islamic Religious Council (MUIB), the Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Foundation or an instalment plan. Those who cannot afford care, the minister said, should "let us know".

 

The weakness lies in that phrase. An invitation to ask is of little use to someone who does not know whom to approach. Fear of a bill can make that distance greater.

 

The man at Sumbiling Baharu told me he did not know the door was there.

 

Insurance is the other answer on offer.

 

At the same press conference, Dato Haji Ahmaddin Haji Abd Rahman, as Minister of Home Affairs, said Takaful Brunei planned to extend medical cover up to the age of 95, with higher premiums for existing illness.

 

I would like to see the quotation offered to a man of 78 with no pension.

 

Welfare follows the same pattern. Since July 2020, applications for monthly assistance and for zakat, the obligatory alms, have gone through Sistem Kebajikan Negara (SKN), the National Welfare System.

 

SKN is a digital platform. By March 2025, it had received more than 68,000 applications.

 

Digital applications bring another barrier. In my report dated 18 October 2025, participants at a BITAR dialogue in Belait described difficulties applying online.

 

Some had never owned a smartphone or computer. Others were unfamiliar with the internet or struggled with missing documents and unstable connections. These were obstacles they described themselves.

 

An online application may be convenient for someone with a device and the skills to use it. For someone without either, applying depends on finding another person to help.

 

At SKN’s introduction, assistance with registration was announced through officers of the Community Development Department (JAPEM) and village heads. The question is whether that support reaches people who do not know it exists.

 

Application figures tell us how many requests reach the system. They do not tell us how many people need help but have yet to apply.

 

The remedies the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports described to the Legislative Council (LegCo) that month were job matching, skills training and small business grants. They suit people who can still work.

 

Three ministries each hold part of his case. Health set the charges. Culture, Youth and Sports administered the pension and runs welfare.

 

Home Affairs oversees his resident status and the district offices, to which the penghulu and ketua kampung, the heads of mukim and village, answer.

 

A body exists to join them, the National Council for Social Issues. I would like to know whether these elders have ever come before it.

 

In 2021, the ministry said pension payments would stop whether they were made through banks or through village heads.

 

Where a village head handed over the pension each month, he knows which hands stopped receiving it.

 

The former pension rolls offer a starting point for finding those affected. Assistance channels also exist. What remains unclear is whether anyone was tasked with contacting these elders and explaining their options.

 

His account does not establish that no outreach has taken place. It does establish that, when we met him, he did not know where to seek help.

 

Turun padang

 

A familiar phrase describes the approach needed here: turun padang, going down to the field. The practice is on the record.

 

In March 2025, Pehin Udana Khatib Dato Paduka Seri Setia Ustaz Haji Awang Badaruddin bin Pengarah Dato Paduka Haji Awang Othman, the then Minister of Religious Affairs, described it to LegCo.

 

In the 1960s and 70s, he said, Welfare Department officers went down to the villages, met the ketua kampung and asked who there should be receiving help.

 

He explained why they had to go. The poorest would not come forward. They were malu, ashamed, to call themselves fakir or miskin, destitute or poor, and relatives discouraged them from applying.

 

The minister believes that reluctance has gone. After 2009, he said, when zakat accumulated over many years was released, applicants came forward in numbers he likened to a floodgate.

 

A rise in applications does not mean everyone knows how to seek help. At Sumbiling Baharu, a man of 78 put his question to a visiting political party.

 

On 24 August this year, His Majesty Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Mu'izzaddin Waddaulah ibni Al-Marhum Sultan Haji Omar 'Ali Saifuddien Sa'adul Khairi Waddien, Sultan and Yang Di-Pertuan of Brunei Darussalam, addressed members of MUIB on the management of zakat.

 

In that titah, or royal address, His Majesty said MUIB "tidak boleh hanya sebagai pemerhati tetapi mesti berada di barisan hadapan": it cannot be only an observer and must be at the forefront.

 

His Majesty did not wish to hear again of applications left pending or help arriving late, and asked for results that could be seen within four months.

 

Earlier advice, His Majesty said, had been "umpama mencurah air ke daun keladi", like water poured on a yam leaf.

 

In 2020, on an unscheduled visit to the Ministry of Religious Affairs, His Majesty had spoken of applicants returning to the MUIB office repeatedly to settle their cases.

 

The August titah was addressed to the Council, the ministry and the zakat department. It also told them to use the existing machinery of government.

 

The penghulu, the ketua kampung and the district offices are part of that machinery. In my reading, the standard extends to the welfare officer and the medical social worker as well.

 

The principle has an older precedent. Abu Ubaid’s Kitab al-Amwal records instructions from the Umayyad caliph Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz to an official who reported a surplus: find those in debt and settle what they owed.

 

The historical account is no substitute for today’s eligibility rules. It illustrates a duty to seek out need, rather than assume that everyone in need will come forward.

 

A question for MUIB

 

The Ministry of Health named MUIB among the places these residents may turn. I do not know what happens when they do, so I put it as a question.

 

The Minister of Religious Affairs told LegCo that withholding zakat from those entitled to it is wrong in law, "salah bagi negara, bagi kerajaan": wrong for the state and for the government.

 

The National Council for Social Issues adopted a Syariah-aligned definition of poverty: a person unable to earn enough for a decent life for himself and his dependants.

 

As reported, that definition does not mention nationality. Eligibility for particular assistance schemes is a separate question.

 

Can a Muslim of long residence in Temburong apply as asnaf fakir miskin, whatever passport he holds? How many like him are among the more than 14,000 His Majesty cited in August?

 

A second question follows. Not every elder in a Temburong longhouse is Muslim. For those who are not, I would like to know which of the Ministry of Health's four avenues is open.

 

A place to begin

 

In March 2025, the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports told LegCo it was reviewing the guidelines for monthly welfare assistance and preparing the next five-year poverty eradication plan.

 

If those documents are still being written, either could provide for elders of long residence whose wives and children are Bruneian. If they are finished, the public should be told what they say.

 

A practical start would be to give one office the task of finding these elders and visiting them. Village heads and district officers could show the way.

 

He gave the District Office almost thirty years of mornings. The pension came and then stopped. The clinic was free, and then it was not.

 

Assistance channels exist, and so do the officers and a council to join the ministries. His Majesty has asked the zakat authorities for results within four months, which runs to late December.

 

The longhouse is not hard to find. We found it on a tourism errand.