Four Months to Fix Zakat Administration: What Will Success Look Like?

17 years after desperate families crowded into a zakat office, Brunei has been given 4 months to demonstrate change. Progress deserves recognition; promises require proof. The fairest test is simple: establish today’s baseline, publish December’s results, and show whether faster administration, stronger controls and human dignity finally move together in practice.

The clock began on 24 August. Official records already provide years of performance data. The question now is whether clear measurements will show what actually changes by December.

By Malai Hassan Othman

KopiTalk with MHO

BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN, 5 September 2026 — Twelve days have passed since His Majesty Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah gave Brunei’s zakat administrators four months to show results.

The instruction followed an unscheduled visit to the Ministry of Religious Affairs on 24 August, amid renewed concern over zakat administration, financial governance and assistance delivery.

MUIB, the Ministry and JUZWAB were told to reorganise strategies and establish plans, clear targets and effective monitoring mechanisms capable of producing visible results within four months.

That places the first meaningful test around late December.

Twelve days is plainly too early to judge whether the reforms have succeeded. It is not too early, however, to establish how success will eventually be measured.

Brunei already possesses something valuable for doing so: several years of official data showing where zakat administration stood before the latest intervention.

In 2023, average processing time for TPOR applications was about 295 days, according to figures presented during the Legislative Council in August 2025.

During the second half of 2024, the average fell to about 157 days. From January to June 2025, it dropped further to approximately 55 days.

That is substantial progress and deserves acknowledgement.

The improvement was attributed to document pre-screening, an investigation task force, assessment tools and ad-hoc meetings dealing with continuing zakat distributions.

Yet the same official account showed the scale of unfinished work.

As of 10 July 2025, 5,951 applications remained unresolved. Among them, 2,422 were classified as “inquiry”, while more than 2,000 were undergoing investigation or verification.

JUZWAB was receiving an average of 556 applications monthly. Officials acknowledged staffing constraints, incomplete documentation and technology still partly dependent on manual processes.

By March this year, another important change had occurred.

A special task force had resolved 2,380 backlog cases dating from 2020 to 2024 within ten weeks, while inquiry cases reportedly remained below 80 monthly over six months.

These figures complicate any suggestion that nothing has changed.

They show that focused intervention can produce measurable improvement—and establish a credible benchmark for what happens next.

What, then, will be measured during these four months?

A useful starting point already exists within the Government’s own records: pending applications, processing times, ageing cases, monthly inflows and completed applications.

The same principle can extend to financial governance. Identified control weaknesses can be recorded at the beginning of the exercise and their corrective status reported afterwards.

Put simply, establish the before now. Publish the after when the four months are over.

If the numbers improve substantially, the evidence will demonstrate that reforms are working. Where indicators remain difficult, they will identify where further attention is required.

Either outcome would be more useful than judging reform through announcements, impressions or anecdote.

His Majesty’s latest intervention makes measurement particularly relevant because the concerns extend beyond applications taking too long.

The official report of the 24 August visit recorded concerns about financial and administrative governance, complaints and audit findings. It also referred to alleged misconduct potentially involving criminal breach of trust and abuse of power.

According to that report, concerns included fidyah money reportedly kept without receipts or banking records, weaknesses involving zakat receipt books and irregular financial statements covering 2013 to 2020. These were reported concerns, not findings against any person identified in this article.

These matters require careful distinction from ordinary processing delays.

Speed can be measured in days. Financial governance requires stronger controls, reconciliation, traceability, supervision and evidence that identified weaknesses have actually been corrected.

The four-month scorecard therefore cannot reasonably consist only of a shorter queue.

It should also show whether stronger controls are operating, aged cases are declining, transactions are properly accounted for and oversight can identify weaknesses before they escalate.

His Majesty specifically called for KPIs and stressed the oversight responsibilities of MUIB and the Ministry alongside JUZWAB’s operational role.

Technology has repeatedly been presented as part of the solution.

In August 2025, the Religious Affairs Ministry told LegCo that JUZWAB’s reform rested on organisational restructuring, digitalisation, human-resource capacity and data-system monitoring.

Artificial intelligence and blockchain were then at the planning and early-discussion stage, while Microsoft 365 automatic workflows were among the immediate digital measures being introduced.

The ambition was clear: faster verification, more accurate assessment of asnaf eligibility, better analysis of collections and distributions, and more efficient administration.

Technology, however, is an instrument. Its value eventually has to appear somewhere outside the computer.

A digital system can show how long an application has remained unresolved. The management test is whether somebody acts before that waiting time becomes unreasonable.

This matters because zakat forms part of a social-protection system carrying substantial human demand.

Between January 2023 and 24 July 2026, official figures show 22,274 people received assistance through JUZWAB and JAPEM. JUZWAB accounted for 17,428 recipients.

Behind those numbers are households for whom processing time is not an abstract performance indicator.

A family waiting for essential assistance experiences administrative time differently from the institution processing its file. Fifty days on a dashboard can mean fifty mornings of uncertainty.

There is also a longer-term test: whether zakat can help recipients capable of doing so move progressively towards greater independence.

PROPAZ therefore deserves attention within the reform exercise.

During the 24 August visit, His Majesty expressed concern that only 244 asnaf had reportedly achieved independence through PROPAZ over 17 years, averaging about 15 annually.

The figure was set against more than 14,000 fakir miskin, prompting calls for new ideas, stronger collaboration and approaches capable of helping more recipients become independent.

Not every asnaf can, or should be expected to, achieve financial independence. Age, disability, family circumstances and employability make uniform expectations both unrealistic and potentially unfair.

But programmes designed around empowerment should be able to explain what success means, how it is measured and whether successful outcomes are sustained.

That question extends beyond PROPAZ.

Brunei’s zakat administration therefore has an unusual opportunity: it need not wait until December to define what success should mean.

Publish a current baseline for unresolved applications, case age, processing time, monthly inflows, completions, control weaknesses and remedial action.

Aggregate performance data can preserve applicants’ confidentiality while allowing MUIB, KHEU and JUZWAB to demonstrate progress in terms understandable to the people they serve.

A clear starting point would also ensure that genuine improvements achieved during these four months are recognised when December arrives.

Our earlier report argued that four months cannot solve every structural problem surrounding poverty, welfare dependency or asnaf empowerment. That assessment remains valid.

The latest exercise, however, is not beginning from zero.

JUZWAB has been a full department since 2023. Its establishment itself was intended to make zakat distribution and related programmes more effective and efficient.

Processing times have since improved. Thousands of historical cases have been addressed, while digitalisation has progressively entered the system.

Fair scrutiny should recognise those gains.

It should equally recognise why another intervention became necessary despite them.

His Majesty has now required clear targets, action plans, monitoring and results within four months. The familiar language of improvement has therefore acquired something it previously lacked: a clock.

Judgement need not be rushed simply because that clock is running.

For now, the fairest test of seriousness may also be the simplest: define the starting line, make success measurable, then let the results speak in December.

 

Source Note

This report draws principally on Ministry of Religious Affairs, Majlis Ugama Islam Brunei and JUZWAB records; Legislative Council reporting from August 2025 and March 2026; and the official account of the 24 August 2026 visit. Historical figures retain their stated reporting periods and should not be read as current unless expressly identified as such.

When the Air Becomes Unsafe: Borneo’s Haze and ASEAN’s Recurring Failure

When children are sent home because the air is unsafe, haze is no longer a seasonal inconvenience. It is a regional failure. After two decades of ASEAN agreements, Brunei must ask: who profits, who is accountable, and why must innocent lungs continue paying the price for preventable fires across borders?

Brunei’s schools have shifted home, public health is threatened, and smoke again crosses borders. After decades of regional promises, ASEAN must explain what will change this time.

By Malai Hassan Othman

Children in Brunei were sent home early on 1 September as deteriorating air quality turned an environmental emergency beyond our borders into an immediate national concern.

Government and private educational institutions were subsequently advised to implement home-based learning from 2 to 3 September, after official readings entered very unhealthy territory.

The decision was prudent. It was also disturbing evidence that transboundary haze is no longer merely obscuring skylines. It is disrupting education, threatening health and narrowing everyday life.

At 4pm on 1 September, Brunei-Muara recorded a Pollutant Standard Index reading of 215, while Belait reached 211, according to official monitoring.

Tutong registered 168 and Temburong 164. Under Brunei’s classification, readings between 101 and 200 are unhealthy, while anything exceeding 200 ranges from very unhealthy to hazardous.

These figures matter more than social media photographs. They establish that Brunei was not merely experiencing reduced visibility, but breathing air officially judged harmful.

The Ministry of Health warned that haze exposure could cause coughing, eye irritation and runny noses, while aggravating asthma, lung disease and existing heart conditions.

People were advised to limit outdoor activities, remain hydrated, use appropriate masks when necessary, and seek treatment if persistent coughing or breathing difficulties developed.

This is where the diplomatic language surrounding transboundary haze must meet its human consequences: children indoors, vulnerable patients at risk, workers exposed and families watching the sky.

Smoke Without Borders

Regional monitoring indicates that widespread fires across Kalimantan and Sumatra have produced moderate-to-dense smoke, carried by prevailing winds across northern Borneo.

The ASEAN Specialised Meteorological Centre reported widespread hotspot activity over Kalimantan and Sumatra, alongside unhealthy to hazardous air quality across parts of Borneo.

Hotspots are satellite detections indicating possible fires. They are not automatically separate confirmed blazes, and totals vary according to cloud cover, satellite passes and reporting periods.

That qualification, however, does not make the crisis less serious. It makes careful reporting essential when numbers are changing almost as rapidly as the wind.

Sarawak Disaster Management Committee chairman Datuk Amar Douglas Uggah Embas said 1,180 hotspots were detected across Kalimantan on 29 August, compared with only nine in Sarawak, as smoke moved towards Malaysian territory.

Uggah told reporters after the same SDMC briefing that Kalimantan had recorded 15,587 hotspot detections over that period, including 13,212 during August alone, revealing an extraordinary concentration during the dry season.

Indonesia’s fires are not exclusively a neighbouring-country inconvenience. Indonesian communities are breathing the same smoke, enduring school disruption, respiratory illnesses, dangerous visibility and environmental destruction.

The crisis has also devastated forests and wildlife. Reuters documented the rescue of an orangutan near a palm-oil plantation in Ketapang, West Kalimantan.

The animal was treated for hypoxia linked to thick smoke and showed signs of an acute respiratory infection, according to the attending veterinarian.

That shared suffering matters. This should not become an exercise in blaming ordinary Indonesians, just as legitimate regional concern should not be silenced by diplomatic sensitivity.

Not Simply the Farmers’ Fault

Land-clearing fires are frequently associated with agriculture. Yet blaming “the farming community” collectively would oversimplify a complex chain of land ownership, commercial interests and regulatory failure.

Smallholders may use fire because it is cheap. Plantation operators, concession holders, illegal land clearers and other commercial actors may also benefit from cleared land.

Drained peatlands make the danger worse. Once ignited, peat can smoulder underground, resist conventional firefighting and release enormous quantities of smoke over extended periods.

Prolonged dry weather and strengthening El Niño conditions intensify the emergency. But drought does not strike a match, drain peatland or excuse weak enforcement.

The weather may explain why fires spread so quickly. It cannot, by itself, explain why the same preventable catastrophe repeatedly returns to the region.

Indonesian authorities have deployed personnel, aircraft, water-bombing operations and weather-modification measures. Suspects have been arrested, while companies connected with affected concessions are being investigated.

Indonesian officials told Reuters that 19 companies were under investigation over fires affecting more than 11,000 hectares. Authorities had identified 42 companies for scrutiny.

These actions deserve recognition. They also invite an unavoidable question: why must large-scale investigations and emergency mobilisation repeatedly begin after the smoke has already crossed borders?

Firefighting helicopters are indispensable during an emergency. They are not substitutes for year-round peatland restoration, transparent concession monitoring, enforceable corporate responsibility and credible prosecution.

Brunei and Malaysia Turn to ASEAN

The haze was discussed during the 27th Annual Leaders’ Consultation between Brunei Darussalam and Malaysia in Bandar Seri Begawan on 22 August.

His Majesty Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Mu’izzaddin Waddaulah and Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim agreed to utilise ASEAN mechanisms in addressing the transboundary emergency.

Anwar subsequently said Malaysia’s Foreign Minister, Datuk Seri Mohamad Hasan, had been asked to manage the matter through the established regional diplomatic framework.

This was neither the creation of a “Borneo Bloc” nor an alliance against Indonesia. It was two affected neighbours acknowledging that smoke cannot be negotiated away bilaterally.

Brunei does not share a land border with Kalimantan. It shares Borneo, regional air currents and the consequences when fires elsewhere overwhelm political boundaries.

Malaysia and Brunei therefore have every right to raise the matter firmly. Their citizens should not be expected to accept hazardous air as an annual cost of regional neighbourliness.

Yet invoking ASEAN is only the beginning. The real test is whether ASEAN’s machinery can produce action beyond monitoring, ministerial discussions and carefully negotiated expressions of concern.

A Treaty Older Than Today’s Schoolchildren

ASEAN members signed the Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution in 2002. It entered into force in 2003 and eventually secured ratification from every member state.

The agreement was presented as a landmark regional commitment to prevent, monitor and mitigate land and forest fires through national action and international co-operation.

ASEAN now also has a Second Haze-Free Roadmap, covering 2023 to 2030, with the declared vision of achieving a transboundary haze-free region.

The architecture is therefore not absent. ASEAN has an agreement, specialist monitoring centre, ministerial structures, roadmaps, targets, technical programmes and years of accumulated experience.

The unresolved test is whether these instruments can produce measurable prevention and accountability when neighbouring populations repeatedly pay the price.

Without transparent compliance measures and publicly traceable national obligations, a legally binding agreement risks becoming stronger in ceremony than in effect.

What Brunei Should Ask

Brunei should support Indonesia’s firefighting and prevention efforts while pressing ASEAN for measurable outcomes, rather than another cycle of emergency meetings followed by seasonal forgetfulness.

Regional authorities should publish harmonised, time-stamped hotspot data, concession ownership information, burned-area assessments, enforcement actions and progress against the Haze-Free Roadmap.

ASEAN should establish clearer thresholds for requesting assistance, activating emergency co-ordination and reviewing whether affected member states have fulfilled their prevention and enforcement responsibilities.

Companies controlling fire-affected concessions should be identified through credible investigations. Penalties, restoration obligations and prosecution outcomes should be reported, not buried after visibility improves.

Affected countries must also examine whether their own investors, financiers, commodity buyers or supply chains are connected to land-use practices contributing to the fires.

Responsibility may begin where the fire is lit, but accountability can extend through boardrooms, lenders, contractors and markets well beyond the burned landscape.

Brunei, meanwhile, should not wait for another PSI spike before strengthening the protective framework tested by this episode.

The Government should publish a clear escalation protocol linking PSI levels and health risk to decisions on home-based learning, outdoor activity and workplace protection.

The protocol should identify who decides, when each measure activates and which institutions and workers are covered, reducing uncertainty as air quality deteriorates.

Standing haze measures should protect outdoor and construction workers, while suitable masks should remain readily accessible through health centres when conditions worsen.

Home-based learning protects children during dangerous conditions. It cannot erase the educational disruption, unequal household circumstances or working parents’ difficulties created by sudden closures.

Official communication should remain frequent and consistent, using Brunei’s PSI rather than mixing it with foreign AQI systems that employ different scales and measurements.

The Air Is a Shared Responsibility

No country controls the wind. Every government, however, retains responsibility for preventing activities within its jurisdiction from inflicting foreseeable harm upon neighbouring populations.

Indonesia cannot prevent every accidental fire across its vast territory. Its regional partners cannot reasonably demand perfection during increasingly severe climatic conditions.

They can reasonably demand prevention, transparency, early intervention, corporate accountability and evidence that lessons from previous emergencies have produced stronger enforcement before the next dry season.

Brunei and Malaysia have correctly taken the matter to ASEAN. Now ASEAN must show that its mechanisms protect lungs as effectively as its communiqués protect diplomatic language.

When schoolchildren are ordered home because the air outside has become unsafe, the haze has already moved beyond an environmental statistic or seasonal irritation.

It has become a public-health emergency, an educational disruption, an economic burden and a direct test of whether regional co-operation carries consequences.

The smoke will eventually clear. Skies will brighten, schools will reopen, and the emergency will gradually disappear from headlines and official social media feeds.

That familiar return to normality is precisely where failure usually begins—when urgency fades, accountability weakens, and prevention is postponed until satellites detect the next fires.

Brunei should not seek confrontation. But neither should neighbourliness require silence while its children, elderly citizens and vulnerable patients repeatedly breathe the consequences of preventable burning.

After more than two decades of ASEAN agreements and roadmaps, the region owes its people something more substantial than another promise to discuss the smoke.

It owes them clean air—and proof that those responsible for poisoning it will no longer find accountability disappearing as quickly as the haze.

When the Khutbah Struck a Public Nerve

A khutbah against bullying struck a deeper public nerve. Beyond classrooms and social media, many recognised the quieter cruelty of power misused—behind desks, inside offices and through systems difficult to question. When compassion is preached, but authority becomes toxic, who protects those too vulnerable to speak or be heard?

COMMENTARY

Bruneians were urged to reject bullying and spread compassion. The reaction showed that many understood its message far beyond the school gate.

By Malai Hassan Othman  |  KopiTalk with MHO

The khutbah spoke about bullying. The public heard something larger.

Delivered across Brunei on 28 August, the Friday sermon urged Muslims to reject intimidation, oppression and cruelty while spreading compassion throughout society.

Its message extended beyond classrooms, identifying schools, workplaces, families and online spaces as environments in which bullying can occur.

That breadth may explain why the khutbah struck such a powerful chord with public sentiment.

Soon after its message circulated, an online discussion moved rapidly from school bullying towards workplaces, businesses, public-facing services and institutional authority.

The discussion offered insufficient verifiable evidence from which broader conclusions could safely be drawn. Its significance lay instead in the experiences and perceptions brought to the surface.

Many contributors appeared to recognise the same underlying pattern: a stronger party exercising power over someone who feels unable to resist without risking further harm.

The sermon did not create that sentiment. It gave existing frustrations a moral vocabulary through which they could be expressed.

Beyond the School Gate

Bullying is commonly imagined as something children do to other children—inside classrooms, along corridors, on playing fields or increasingly through mobile telephones.

Its visible forms are easily recognised: physical aggression, insults, threats, humiliation, exclusion and the deliberate targeting of someone perceived as weaker.

But bullying does not disappear when school ends. It changes its clothes.

For a student, power may come from physical strength, popularity or the protection of a group. For an employee, it may come from rank.

For a contractor, power may lie with whoever controls an approval or payment. For an applicant, it may rest behind a counter or desk.

The common thread is not merely conflict. It is the imbalance that leaves one party feeling unable to respond without inviting greater difficulty.

The line is crossed when authority becomes intimidation, explanation gives way to humiliation, or questioning a decision appears likely to invite retaliation.

That is when authority ceases to feel like responsibility and begins to feel like coercion.

The Little Napoleon Behind the Desk

The public reaction recalled a figure KopiTalk with MHO has examined before: the so-called “Little Napoleon”.

This is rarely someone occupying the highest office. The authority may be modest, but its consequences can be considerable for those affected.

The “Little Napoleon” treats delegated responsibility as personal territory. Rules become weapons, procedure becomes a barrier, and service becomes a demonstration of control.

He—or she—may hide behind regulations without explaining them, impose requirements inconsistently or prolong a process because nobody lower down can challenge the decision.

The problem begins when limited authority is exercised without amanah, proportion, transparency or regard for its human consequences.

For the officer, it may be one more file awaiting attention. For the person outside, that file may determine whether a livelihood survives.

A delayed approval can prevent a business from opening. An unexplained payment delay can affect workers, suppliers and families far removed from the original transaction.

A junior employee repeatedly humiliated by a superior may continue reporting for duty because resignation would place the household’s income at risk.

The outward forms differ from school bullying. The inner experience—dependency, fear, humiliation and powerlessness—may feel disturbingly familiar.

When Rules Become Weapons

Rules are essential. They protect fairness only when they are applied fairly.

When requirements change without adequate explanation, or similar cases receive different treatment, people may begin to suspect that procedure depends upon personality.

When follow-up questions are treated as disrespect, the public may learn that silence is safer than seeking clarification.

When complaints return to the same office or superior being questioned, confidence in the process can weaken, however orderly the procedure may appear internally.

Trust is rarely destroyed by one dramatic incident. It is worn down through unanswered correspondence, unexplained delays and the feeling that nobody owns the problem.

An institution may consider its decision lawful and procedurally correct. The person affected may still experience the process as dismissive and demeaning.

That distinction sits close to the heart of the khutbah’s message.

Compassion is not simply feeling sorry for someone after harm has occurred. It means exercising power carefully enough to prevent unnecessary harm.

Public Service Is Still Service

Brunei’s public service is not a single, unfeeling structure.

Thousands of officers fulfil their responsibilities conscientiously, often under workloads, procedural limitations and manpower constraints invisible to members of the public.

Many serve with professionalism, patience and courtesy. Some resolve difficult cases quietly without ever receiving recognition for doing their jobs well.

The concern is whether poor conduct and defective processes are identified before isolated failures become accepted workplace culture.

An officer who humiliates the public damages more than one person’s day. The encounter can influence how a family, business or community views the institution.

People rarely separate the individual behind the counter from the organisation whose name appears above it.

Service standards must therefore measure more than whether a form was processed. They must also consider clarity, consistency, responsiveness and dignity.

Efficiency without humanity can still leave the public feeling badly served.

Not Government Alone

The online discussion produced an important counterpoint. Some contributors believed bullying and exploitation were equally serious within private workplaces.

They described low pay, excessive workloads, arbitrary contract changes, humiliation by supervisors and fear of losing employment for questioning management.

Their accounts widened the conversation beyond government.

Bullying can emerge in public offices, private companies, schools, families, associations and online communities.

It can flow from employer to employee, supervisor to subordinate, teacher to student, senior colleague to junior colleague—or sometimes in the opposite direction.

Members of the public can also bully frontline officers through verbal abuse, threats and viral accusations released before the full circumstances are understood.

Compassion cannot be demanded only from whichever side we support. The same moral standard must protect the citizen facing authority and the officer facing abuse.

It must defend employees from humiliation while allowing managers to uphold genuine standards and responsibilities.

The Silence Around Workplace Bullying

KopiTalk with MHO previously examined workplace harassment and the fear surrounding those who consider speaking out.

The recurring concerns were unequal authority, possible retaliation, uncertain reporting channels and anxiety that lodging a complaint could damage future employment.

These concerns help explain why adult bullying is often harder to see.

A bruised child may attract immediate attention. An employee who has been systematically isolated, belittled or undermined may continue appearing at work as usual.

Victims may question whether the conduct is serious enough to report. They may also wonder whether witnesses will support them when livelihoods are involved.

Some organisations have complaint mechanisms on paper. Their effectiveness depends upon whether employees trust the people receiving and investigating those complaints.

A reporting channel is not credible merely because an email address, hotline or form exists.

People need to know how confidentiality is protected, when a response can be expected and whether the reviewer is sufficiently independent.

Silence does not necessarily mean nothing happened. Sometimes, it means the affected person believes speaking will make the situation worse.

What Children Learn From Adults

In September 2025, His Majesty declared that bullying and unacceptable behaviour had no place in Brunei’s culture.

That message followed official figures showing 447 reported school-bullying cases in 2024, down from 734 during the previous year.

Government responded with disciplinary procedures, counselling, monitoring and programmes intended to strengthen empathy, intervention and student responsibility.

Those measures addressed an acknowledged problem among young people. The latest khutbah invites reflection upon the adult environments those students will eventually enter.

What happens when a child taught not to bully joins a workplace where public humiliation is regarded as normal leadership?

What happens when students are encouraged to report intimidation, but adults believe reporting workplace mistreatment may jeopardise their careers?

What lesson is absorbed when compassion is taught as personal morality but is not consistently experienced in positions of authority?

Children learn from instructions. They also learn from the society surrounding them.

A national stand against bullying must examine not only student behaviour, but also the adult behaviour children observe and may eventually inherit.

From Sermon to System

The khutbah urged witnesses not to remain silent, merely observe or ridicule victims. Instead, they should intervene appropriately and report bullying responsibly.

That advice carries an institutional obligation.

People can only report confidently when accessible channels exist, evidence is treated fairly and protection against retaliation is more than an assurance.

The challenge is to distinguish legitimate authority from intimidation—and ordinary procedural difficulty from recurring misuse of power.

Clearer service timelines, written explanations, credible appeals, protected workplace reporting and supervisory accountability would help draw that distinction.

Leadership must also recognise that dignity is part of organisational performance, not an optional courtesy offered when workloads permit.

The Islamic principle of ihsan provides a deeper measure. Competence asks whether the work was completed. Ihsan asks how conscientiously and humanely it was done.

Without ihsan, rules can become walls. Authority can lose its conscience, and service can forget the people it was established to serve.

Why the Khutbah Resonated

Moral guidance cannot be restricted to the least powerful members of society.

If bullying involves exploiting strength against someone less able to defend himself, its warning applies wherever power becomes detached from compassion.

It applies to students and teachers, managers and employees, institutions and citizens, parents and children—and social-media users shielded by anonymity.

Beneath the online anger was a concern worth stating plainly: some people do not believe they have somewhere credible to turn, or that those holding power will listen.

The khutbah struck that chord directly.

It asked Bruneians to examine bullying. The online response suggested that society may still struggle to recognise it once the bully is no longer wearing a school uniform.

That recognition should begin with ensuring that none of us—individuals, managers or institutions—uses power in ways that deny others dignity, explanation and fair recourse.

A mirror serves little purpose when it is always pointed at someone else.

Source Note

Principal references and earlier reporting:

• Ministry of Religious Affairs: Friday khutbah summary, 28 August 2026

• Media Permata: ‘Jauhi buli, sebarkan kasih sayang’

• Reddit / r/nasikatok: Public discussion prompted by the khutbah

• KopiTalk with MHO: ‘Bullying Has No Place Here’

• KopiTalk with MHO: ‘Sexual Harassment Cases Double’

• KopiTalk with MHO: ‘Little Napoleons and Red Tape’

A Job, a Home, a Future: The Real Test of 2035

 KopiTalk LegCo Tracker · Second Meeting — Special Report

Reading the Signals. Testing the Delivery.

Brunei’s road to 2035 will not be measured by statistics alone. Can a job become a career, an income build security, and a family afford a home? LegCo’s debate on purchasing power, employment and housing raises a deeper question: are we merely sustaining lives — or enabling futures worth building?

LegCo raised three everyday concerns — purchasing power, employment and housing. Behind them lies a bigger question: is Brunei creating the economic conditions citizens need to build the high quality of life envisioned for 2035?

By Malai Hassan Othman · KopiTalk with MHO

BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN — Brunei has nine years remaining to realise Wawasan 2035. For ordinary citizens, however, that future is already being built — or postponed — today.

The Second Meeting of the 22nd Legislative Council brought that reality into sharp focus through three familiar concerns: cost of living, employment and housing.

Yang Berhormat Awang Amran bin Haji Maidin, Penghulu Mukim Lumapas – Daerah Brunei dan Muara, brought the three together during debate on the fifth day of proceedings.

His benchmark was not whether Bruneians could simply survive.

It was whether they could save, own homes, raise families and plan their futures — the ordinary foundations of a stable life.

That distinction matters because Brunei's national ambition is considerably higher than providing enough for people merely to get by.

Wawasan 2035 seeks a highly educated and skilled population, a high quality of life, and an economy that is dynamic and resilient.

Its quality-of-life framework includes a high standard of living, high home ownership, social mobility, quality infrastructure and excellence in public-service delivery.

The question emerging from LegCo, therefore, reaches beyond whether groceries cost more, enough vacancies exist or sufficient houses are being constructed.

It asks whether the economic environment is strong enough to turn education and work into income, security, home ownership and upward mobility.

On living costs, Awang Amran acknowledged forces Brunei cannot completely control, including global economic conditions, transportation costs, supply chains and currency movements.

But households experience those pressures differently. Families on fixed incomes feel increases in food, transport, education and everyday necessities directly through what remains each month.

His argument shifted the discussion from prices towards purchasing power.

Prices cannot always be controlled, he said, but people's ability to meet living costs can be strengthened through better employment, skills and opportunities for higher incomes.

That matters because cost of living is not determined by prices alone. It also reflects what people earn, what Government cushions and what households ultimately pay themselves.

Brunei has long recognised that relationship.

In 1998, Government introduced Elaun Sara Hidup across much of the public service specifically to assist with living costs, particularly benefiting lower-paid employees.

The allowance was graduated. Division IV and below received B$140 monthly, before the Government increased the amount to B$170 in 2006 while other divisional rates remained unchanged.

The significance is not whether that historical allowance should automatically be increased today. The available documents alone do not establish sufficient grounds for that conclusion.

What the policy history demonstrates is more fundamental: Government recognised that living-cost pressures fall differently across income levels and may require targeted intervention.

Two decades later, LegCo is again asking how purchasing power can be strengthened — this time by connecting it directly with employment and income progression.

Here, the debate became sharper.

Awang Amran questioned whether available opportunities genuinely enable Bruneians to improve their skills, progress professionally and increase their incomes over time.

His distinction was simple: “Pekerjaan memberikan pendapatan hari ini, tetapi kerjaya memberikan masa depan.”

A job provides income today. A career provides a future.

For years, unemployment has understandably dominated employment discussions. But reducing unemployment alone does not establish whether available jobs can support increasingly independent lives.

Employment becomes transformative when experience builds skills, productivity supports better earnings and those earnings give households sufficient room to progress.

Without that progression, somebody can be statistically employed while remaining economically constrained — neither necessarily poor nor sufficiently secure to build the future envisaged.

Wawasan's three goals — skilled people, high quality of life and a dynamic, resilient economy — may appear separately on paper, but economically they depend upon one another.

Skills need productive opportunities. Businesses need investment and competitiveness. Workers need career progression. Households need incomes capable of supporting increasingly independent lives.

That is where housing enters the equation.

Awang Amran argued that housing should remain part of family-welfare policy rather than being regarded simply as another physical development programme.

For younger Bruneians establishing families, suitable housing provides stability. Excessive housing costs, however, can reduce what households have available for other necessities.

His proposed measurement was revealing.

Success should not be judged only by how many houses are built, but by how many families obtain appropriate, comfortable housing within their means.

That changes the measurement from construction to outcome.

A completed house represents an output. A household capable of sustaining that home while meeting other responsibilities represents something considerably closer to development.

That distinction also surfaced elsewhere during the Second Meeting.

Yang Berhormat Awang Lau How Teck, S.N.B., P.S.B., cautioned against measuring success merely through completed projects or implemented programmes, asking whether they increased productivity and created continuing economic opportunities.

The Government's closing assessment similarly acknowledged that today's development challenges increasingly overlap — linking education with employment, economic growth with productivity, and social wellbeing with housing and protection.

Therein lies the larger issue beneath cost of living, employment and housing.

Brunei does not lack policy interventions. Government cushions important household costs, provides extensive public services, develops housing, supports employment programmes and continues pursuing economic diversification.

Those interventions provide a substantial social cushion.

But cushioning household costs and creating greater household earning power are not quite the same thing.

The first protects living standards. The second enables citizens to progressively build those standards through productive incomes, careers, assets and savings.

For Wawasan 2035, Brunei needs both.

The question is whether the wider economy is becoming strong enough to generate productive incomes capable of supporting greater household independence and resilience.

That depends partly upon what happens beyond Government.

Businesses require productivity and revenue to sustain better wages. Investment must create lasting domestic value, while local enterprises need sufficient competitiveness to create careers rather than vacancies.

Individuals also carry responsibilities through education, skills, adaptability, financial discipline and realistic expectations. Government cannot manufacture prosperity for every household.

But individual effort operates within an environment citizens cannot create themselves. Labour markets, wage structures, housing supply and economic diversification ultimately involve policy, investment and business conditions.

This is why LegCo's three concerns should not be treated merely as separate responsibilities distributed among different ministries.

They are three tests of the same environment.

Does work provide pathways towards better incomes? Can those incomes build security? Can households translate that security into homes, families, savings and reasonable confidence about tomorrow?

If those answers strengthen over the coming nine years, Wawasan's high-quality-of-life ambition becomes considerably more tangible.

If they do not, Government may continue recording jobs created, houses completed and programmes delivered while households experience progress rather differently.

None of this establishes that Brunei faces a general cost-of-living crisis. The LegCo record does not support such a conclusion.

It establishes something more nuanced: legislators are questioning whether people's ability to meet living costs can be strengthened through better jobs, income progression and affordable housing.

That is ultimately a question of economic transmission.

Brunei can attract investment — but does sufficient value reach Bruneian careers and incomes?

It can build houses — but can households sustainably afford the lives built around them?

It can cushion living costs — but is the productive economy increasingly capable of supporting the standard of living citizens expect?

Those are legitimate questions nine years from 2035.

The Second Meeting itself concluded with Government emphasising that policies and initiatives must produce efficient services, quality employment, conducive business conditions and solutions affecting everyday life.

That provides perhaps the most appropriate benchmark.

National rankings measure progress from above.

Households experience it from below.

By 2035, policymakers will have indicators, rankings, programmes and performance measures with which to assess how far Brunei has travelled.

Ordinary Bruneians will probably use simpler measurements.

Did education lead somewhere? Did a job become a career? Did income grow? Could a family obtain a suitable home?

Could it save, withstand setbacks and plan confidently for tomorrow?

Individual choices will influence those answers. But they will also reflect the economy and policy environment Brunei builds around its people.

That may be the deeper message behind LegCo's discussion of living costs, employment and housing.

Wawasan 2035 envisages people who are skilled and successful, enjoying high-quality lives within a dynamic and resilient economy.

The real test is whether ordinary Bruneians are being given the economic conditions to build that life for themselves.

SOURCE NOTE

Second Meeting of the 22nd Legislative Council proceedings and official Council reporting, August 2026; Wawasan Brunei 2035 official framework; Prime Minister's Office Circular No. 12/1998 and Circular No. 15/2006 on Elaun Sara Hidup.

LIMBANG: SEMPADAN BOLEH DIGARIS, SEJARAH TIDAK BOLEH DIPADAM

Di sebalik setiap garis sempadan, tersimpan sejarah, maruah dan amanah generasi. Brunei memilih jalan damai, namun kedamaian tidak menuntut kita melupakan Limbang. Apakah yang diputuskan, apakah yang masih dirundingkan, dan apakah yang wajar diketahui rakyat? Persahabatan sejati tumbuh melalui kejelasan, saling menghormati dan kebenaran yang dijelaskan dengan bijaksana serta berhemah.

NDP menyokong penuh kebijaksanaan Kebawah Duli Yang Maha Mulia dan usaha Kerajaan menyelesaikan sempadan secara aman. Namun, rakyat wajar diberikan penerangan mengenai kedudukan sebenar Limbang dan didengar melalui saluran yang sah sebelum apa-apa keputusan baharu yang menyentuh amanah sejarah ini dimuktamadkan.

Oleh Malai Hassan Othman

Pengerusi Lembaga Penasihat, Parti Pembangunan Bangsa (NDP)

MENYOKONG KERAJAAN. MEMPERTAHANKAN KEDAULATAN. MELIBATKAN RAKYAT.

Parti Pembangunan Bangsa (NDP) menjunjung tinggi kebijaksanaan Kebawah Duli Yang Maha Mulia Paduka Seri Baginda Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Mu‘izzaddin Waddaulah ibni Al-Marhum Sultan Haji Omar ‘Ali Saifuddien Sa‘adul Khairi Waddien, Sultan dan Yang Di-Pertuan Negara Brunei Darussalam, dalam menangani isu sempadan negara melalui rundingan yang aman dan bermaruah.

NDP juga menyatakan sokongan padu kepada Kerajaan Kebawah Duli Yang Maha Mulia dalam mempertahankan kedaulatan, kepentingan dan hak Negara Brunei Darussalam berasaskan sejarah, undang-undang serta kaedah persempadanan yang dipersetujui.

Pertemuan baginda dengan Yang Amat Berhormat Dato Laila Utama Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim, Perdana Menteri Malaysia, pada 22 Ogos 2026 membuka ruang baharu untuk menyelesaikan perkara yang telah tertangguh selama puluhan tahun.

Kita menyambut kemajuan itu. Tetapi sebuah sempadan bukan sekadar batu tanda. Di belakang setiap garis ada sejarah, maruah negara dan masa depan rakyat.

KEMAJUAN YANG WAJAR DIHARGAI

Dalam Perundingan Tahunan Ketua-Ketua Kerajaan Kali Ke-27, kedua-dua pemimpin mengambil maklum bahawa kira-kira separuh sempadan darat Brunei–Malaysia telah diukur dan ditandakan bersama.

Daripada keseluruhan 528.45 kilometer, sebanyak 264.791 kilometer telah diselesaikan. Kedua-dua negara menyasarkan keseluruhan kerja pengukuran dan penandaan disempurnakan menjelang 2034.

Ini kemajuan yang nyata. Rundingan lebih baik daripada pertelingkahan. Persetujuan lebih baik daripada ketegangan. Jiran yang baik tidak mengangkat suara apabila meja rundingan masih terbuka.

Namun kejayaan teknikal belum semestinya menjawab semua persoalan politik dan sejarah. Garis boleh diukur dalam kilometer. Amanah tidak boleh diukur dengan angka semata-mata.

TIGA TARIKH, TIGA PERSOALAN

Perdana Menteri Malaysia menyatakan bahawa parameter asas bagi tuntutan bertindih boleh diselesaikan sebelum akhir 2026. Sektor F–G pula disasarkan selesai pada 31 Mei 2027. Keseluruhan sempadan dijangka siap pada 2034.

Tiga tempoh ini merujuk kepada tiga lapisan kerja yang berbeza. Ia tidak boleh dicampur sehingga rakyat menyangka semua persoalan telah atau akan diselesaikan pada tarikh yang sama.

Lebih penting, kenyataan bersama tidak menyebut Limbang secara khusus. Ketiadaan nama itu tidak membuktikan bahawa tuntutan tersebut masih hidup. Ia juga tidak membuktikan bahawa tuntutan itu telah mati.

Berdasarkan maklumat yang tersedia kepada umum, kedudukan Limbang masih belum dapat dikenal pasti dengan jelas.

TIGA TARIKH — SEPINTAS LALU

• Parameter asas tuntutan bertindih — disasarkan sebelum akhir 2026

• Sektor F–G (≈ 6.6 km, Bebuloh–Bukit Gadong) — disasarkan 31 Mei 2027

• Keseluruhan sempadan darat Brunei–Malaysia — disasarkan siap 2034

• Nama “Limbang” — tidak disebut khusus dalam kenyataan bersama

SEKTOR F–G BUKAN SELURUH PERSOALAN LIMBANG

Sektor F–G melibatkan kira-kira 6.6 kilometer dari Bebuloh menuju kawasan berhampiran Bukit Gadong, Kampong Limau Manis dan laluan Kuala Lurah–Tedungan.

Kedua-dua negara bersetuju menentukan satu garis watershed, iaitu rabung pemisah aliran air, sebagai asas kerja pengukuran dan penandaan di sektor tersebut.

Sektor ini berada di lingkungan sempadan Brunei-Muara–Limbang. Oleh itu, ia berkaitan secara geografi dengan Limbang. Namun ia bukan keseluruhan persoalan tuntutan sejarah terhadap wilayah Limbang.

Kesilapan menyamakan kedua-duanya boleh mengelirukan rakyat. Lebih buruk, ia boleh mencipta kesimpulan yang tidak pernah dinyatakan oleh kedua-dua kerajaan.

SEJARAH YANG BELUM KEHILANGAN SUARANYA

Limbang pernah berada di bawah pemerintahan Kesultanan Brunei. Sultan Hashim Jalilul Alam Aqamaddin berulang kali menolak penyerahannya kepada Sarawak.

Pada Mac 1890, Charles Brooke menduduki Limbang tanpa persetujuan Sultan Hashim. Baginda juga menolak pampasan tahunan kerana wilayah bukan barang dagangan yang boleh ditukar dengan wang.

British kemudian menerima pengilhakan itu dan menganggap perkara tersebut selesai pada 1895. Tetapi menutup sebuah fail pentadbiran tidak semestinya memadam bantahan pihak yang kehilangan wilayah.

Pada Oktober 1970, rekod rasmi Pelita Brunei menyiarkan pendirian Al-Marhum Sultan Haji Omar ‘Ali Saifuddien Sa‘adul Khairi Waddien bahawa tuntutan terhadap Limbang masih diteruskan dan sempadannya belum pernah dipersetujui oleh Brunei.

Sejarah ini bukan alasan untuk membangkitkan kebencian terhadap Malaysia. Generasi hari ini tidak bersalah atas keputusan kuasa kolonial pada masa lalu.

Namun berdamai dengan jiran tidak bererti kita mesti hilang ingatan. Persahabatan yang matang tidak takut kepada sejarah yang benar.

PERSOALAN BESAR DALAM PERTUKARAN SURAT 2009

Pada 16 Mac 2009, baginda dan Perdana Menteri Malaysia ketika itu, Tun Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, menandatangani Pertukaran Surat yang menjadi asas penting penyelesaian isu darat dan maritim.

Kerajaan Malaysia kemudian dilaporkan menyatakan bahawa Brunei telah menggugurkan tuntutannya terhadap Limbang. Sebaliknya, Menteri Hal Ehwal Luar Negeri dan Perdagangan Kedua Brunei ketika itu, Pehin Dato Lim Jock Seng, dilaporkan berkata Limbang tidak dibincangkan.

Dua kenyataan itu membawa makna yang berbeza. Teks penuh surat, lampiran dan petanya pula tidak tersedia untuk penelitian awam.

NDP tidak akan membuat kesimpulan tanpa dokumen. Kita tidak boleh mendakwa Limbang telah diserahkan. Kita juga tidak boleh mendakwa tuntutan itu masih aktif tanpa pengesahan rasmi.

Atas dasar kepentingan negara, NDP dengan penuh hormat memohon penjelasan melalui saluran yang sah: jika kedudukannya telah berubah, bila ia berubah, melalui instrumen apa dan atas pertimbangan siapa? Jika ia tidak pernah dibincangkan, mengapa timbul pengumuman bahawa tuntutan telah digugurkan?

Soalan bukan tanda derhaka. Soalan yang jujur ialah usaha menjaga amanah supaya keputusan negara difahami, bukan sekadar diwarisi sebagai teka-teki.

NDP TELAH LAMA MEMBAWA AMANAH INI

Pendirian NDP bukan lahir selepas pertemuan terbaru. Sejak 2008, parti telah meminta penjelasan mengenai kedudukan Limbang dan persempadanan Brunei–Sarawak.

Kongres Agung Tahunan Ke-5 pada 2010 menegaskan bahawa tuntutan Limbang mesti dibezakan daripada proses penandaan sempadan berdasarkan lima perjanjian 1920 hingga 1939 dan prinsip watershed.

Pendirian itu diulangi dalam Kongres Agung Tahunan Ke-11 pada 2016. NDP menyokong keputusan Kerajaan Kebawah Duli Yang Maha Mulia, tetapi pada masa yang sama meminta ketelusan dan penglibatan perwakilan rakyat.

Ini bukan politik bermusim. Ini amanah yang belum menerima jawapan yang dapat difahami oleh rakyat.

RAKYAT WAJAR DIBERI PENJELASAN

Kuasa membuat perjanjian antarabangsa terletak pada institusi negara menurut undang-undang dan Perlembagaan. NDP menghormati susunan itu.

Namun menghormati kuasa tidak bererti rakyat mesti dibiarkan dalam gelap. Keputusan mengenai wilayah, sempadan dan warisan negara akan dipikul bukan sahaja oleh kerajaan hari ini, tetapi juga oleh anak cucu kita.

NDP tidak mendakwa bahawa rakyat mempunyai kuasa perlembagaan untuk mengambil alih atau menentukan rundingan diplomatik. Penglibatan yang dimohon ialah penerangan, permuzakarahan dan perwakilan melalui saluran negara yang sah.

Sempadan menentukan di mana undang-undang berkuat kuasa. Sejarah menentukan mengapa rakyat merasakan garis itu milik mereka. Masa depan menentukan sama ada keputusan hari ini akan diterima dengan yakin atau dipersoalkan selama beberapa generasi.

Artikel ini tidak membuat kesimpulan bahawa tuntutan Limbang masih berkuat kuasa atau telah digugurkan. NDP hanya memohon penjelasan rasmi berdasarkan dokumen, undang-undang dan saluran pentadbiran yang sah.

EMPAT PERKARA YANG NDP MOHON DIJELASKAN

• Kerajaan wajar menerbitkan penjelasan bahasa mudah mengenai skop Pertukaran Surat 2009, tanpa mendedahkan perkara yang benar-benar boleh menjejaskan rundingan atau keselamatan negara.

• Nyatakan sama ada Limbang masih dianggap tuntutan berasingan, telah digugurkan secara rasmi atau dianggap selesai melalui proses persempadanan di bawah kerangka 2009
  
  
• Jelaskan kawasan yang telah dipersetujui, kawasan yang masih bertindih dan perbezaan antara parameter asas 2026, Sektor F–G pada 2027 dan penyiapan keseluruhan sempadan pada 2034
  
  
• Wujudkan mekanisme permuzakarahan dengan Majlis Mesyuarat Negara, perwakilan masyarakat dan pihak berkepentingan sebelum apa-apa keputusan baharu atau lanjutan yang menyentuh kedudukan sejarah Limbang dimuktamadkan

Permintaan ini bukan cabaran kepada Kerajaan. Ia sokongan supaya keputusan Kerajaan berdiri di atas kefahaman rakyat, bukan di bawah bayang-bayang keraguan.

PERSAHABATAN TIDAK MEMERLUKAN KITA MELUPAKAN DIRI

Brunei dan Malaysia bukan sekadar jiran. Kita dihubungkan oleh agama, bahasa, keluarga, perdagangan dan perjalanan hidup yang melintasi sempadan setiap hari.

NDP tidak mahu Limbang dijadikan api untuk membakar hubungan dua negara. Kita mahu ia menjadi lampu yang menerangi sejarah dan menunjukkan jalan kepada penyelesaian yang adil.

Kita menyokong baginda. Kita menyokong Kerajaan. Kerana sokongan itulah kita mahu setiap hak Brunei dipertahankan, setiap keputusan dijelaskan dan setiap suara rakyat diberi tempat yang sewajarnya.

Garis sempadan boleh dimuktamadkan di atas peta. Tetapi sejarah tetap hidup dalam ingatan rakyat. Jangan biarkan sempadan selesai ditandakan sedangkan persoalan terbesar di atasnya masih tidak bernama.

Limbang tidak harus menjadi alasan untuk bermusuh. Tetapi Limbang juga tidak harus menjadi nama yang kita takut untuk sebut.

Semoga Allah memberi hikmah kepada para pemimpin kita dalam merundingkan sempadan ini, mengurniakan ketenangan kepada rakyat yang menanti kejelasan, dan memelihara persahabatan Brunei dan Malaysia di atas keadilan dan kebenaran.

Dari Meja Penasihat

Parti Pembangunan Bangsa (NDP)

Catatan sumber: Kenyataan Bersama Perundingan Tahunan Ketua-Ketua Kerajaan Kali Ke-27 (22 Ogos 2026); sidang media Perdana Menteri Malaysia; rekod Pelita Brunei 14 dan 21 Oktober 1970; Pertukaran Surat 2009; kenyataan Kerajaan Malaysia dan kenyataan Pehin Dato Lim Jock Seng berkaitan Limbang pada 2009; serta Usul-Usul Khas NDP 2010 dan 2016.

 

ULIL AMRI TELAH MENUNAIKAN AMANAHNYA — SUDAHKAH KITA?

Apabila Ulil Amri sendiri berkata tegurannya umpama mencurah air ke daun keladi, persoalannya bukan lagi sama ada arahan telah didengar. Persoalannya: siapakah benar-benar melaksanakannya? Empat bulan telah diberikan. Amanah zakat menyentuh hak asnaf, kepercayaan umat dan pertanggungjawaban kepada Allah. Kali ini, perubahan mesti dapat dilihat, diukur dan dirasakan rakyat.

Kebawah Duli Yang Maha Mulia sendiri menegaskan bahawa baginda menegur pengurusan zakat selaku Ulil Amri. Baginda telah menegur. Kini mereka yang memegang amanah mesti bertindak.

Oleh Malai Hassan Othman

Pengerusi Lembaga Penasihat, Parti Pembangunan Bangsa (NDP)

ULIL AMRI TELAH MENUNAIKAN AMANAHNYA. KINI TUNAIKAN AMANAH KITA.

Parti Pembangunan Bangsa (NDP) berdiri teguh bersama Kebawah Duli Yang Maha Mulia Paduka Seri Baginda Sultan dan Yang Di-Pertuan Negara Brunei Darussalam.

Pada 24 Ogos 2026, baginda sengaja mengundang ahli-ahli MUIB ke Kementerian Hal Ehwal Ugama kerana badan berkanun itu bertanggungjawab langsung terhadap zakat.

Isu yang dibangkitkan baginda bukan perkara kecil. Ia menyentuh zakat, amanah agama dan nasib mereka yang hidup dalam kesusahan.

Titah sudah jelas. Masalah sudah dikenal pasti. Pihak yang bertanggungjawab kini perlu menjelaskan bagaimana kelemahan lama akan diperbetulkan.

BAGINDA MENEGUR SELAKU ULIL AMRI

Yang paling penting, baginda sendiri menyatakan bahawa teguran itu dibuat selaku Ulil Amri. Istilah tersebut membawa makna yang berat.

Baginda tampil sebagai pemegang amanah agama yang bertanggungjawab kepada Allah untuk menjaga keadilan dan kemaslahatan umat.

Baginda telah menjalankan tanggungjawab itu dengan menegur dan menetapkan tempoh pembetulan. Mereka di bawah baginda kini wajib menjalankan tanggungjawab masing-masing.

Jawatan bukan perhiasan. Kuasa bukan perlindungan. Semakin tinggi kedudukan, semakin berat amanah yang akan dipertanggungjawabkan di hadapan Allah.

JANGAN LAGI SEPERTI AIR DI DAUN KELADI

Baginda menyifatkan nasihat dan teguran terdahulu seperti “mencurah air ke daun keladi”. Air jatuh, daun basah, tetapi tidak meresap.

Maksudnya jelas: teguran telah disampaikan, namun perubahan yang diharapkan masih belum dapat dibuktikan.

Kesetiaan tidak dibuktikan melalui slogan atau kata-kata yang indah. Kesetiaan dibuktikan apabila titah diterjemahkan menjadi hasil.

Apabila Ulil Amri sendiri menggunakan kiasan sekeras itu, mesej baginda tidak lagi memerlukan penjelasan. Setiap teguran mesti diterjemahkan kepada perubahan yang dapat dibuktikan.

APABILA KAWALAN AMANAH DIPERSOALKAN

Titah terbaru lebih serius. Baginda membangkitkan kemungkinan salah laku yang menjurus kepada pecah amanah dan penyalahgunaan kuasa.

Rujukan kepada kemungkinan salah laku itu berdasarkan perkara yang dibangkitkan dalam titah. Ia tidak bermakna mana-mana individu telah didapati bersalah.

Baginda mendedahkan bahawa wang fidyah didapati disimpan dalam laci tanpa resit dan rekod bank. Kawalan buku resit zakat harta pula menimbulkan persoalan.

Menurut titah, penyata akaun kumpulan wang zakat bagi tempoh 2013 hingga 2020 juga didapati tidak teratur.

Ini bukan lagi soal borang yang lambat diproses. Ini soal keselamatan wang yang diserahkan oleh umat Islam atas nama ibadah.

Jika terdapat bukti salah laku, siasatlah dengan bebas dan telus. Jika wujud unsur jenayah, serahkan kepada pihak penguatkuasaan.

Siasatan hendaklah berjalan tanpa dipengaruhi jawatan atau hubungan. Pada masa yang sama, tiada sesiapa patut dihukum tanpa bukti. Keadilan mesti berjalan bersama keberanian.

PENEMUAN TITAH — SEPINTAS LALU

• Wang fidyah — dalam laci, tiada resit, tiada rekod bank
  
  
• Buku resit zakat harta — kawalan dipersoalkan
  
  
• Penyata akaun zakat 2013–2020 — tidak teratur
  
  
• Tempoh pembetulan yang diberikan — empat bulan, kepada MUIB, KHEU dan JUZWAB

MUIB TIDAK BOLEH SEKADAR MELIHAT

MUIB memegang tanggungjawab berkanun terhadap zakat, wakaf dan Baitulmal. Amanah itu tidak boleh diserahkan bulat-bulat kepada JUZWAB.

Baginda telah menegaskan bahawa MUIB tidak boleh menjadi pemerhati. Pengawasan mesti berlaku sebelum kelemahan bertukar menjadi krisis.

Jika laporan audit sudah menunjukkan masalah, mengapa ruang ketirisan belum ditutup? Jika aduan telah diterima, mengapa perkara sama masih berulang?

Pertanyaan ini bukan serangan terhadap institusi agama. Ia usaha menyelamatkan kewibawaannya sebelum keyakinan masyarakat semakin pudar.

TEKNOLOGI TIDAK BOLEH MENGGANTIKAN MANUSIA

NDP mengakui beberapa kemajuan, termasuk pembayaran zakat dalam talian, sistem digital dan usaha memendekkan tempoh pemprosesan.

Namun komputer tidak mempunyai amanah. Manusialah yang memastikan maklumat dalam sistem diikuti dengan tindakan.

Sistem boleh menunjukkan fail yang tertangguh. Sistem tidak dapat menjawab mengapa pegawai membiarkannya tertangguh.

Jangan meraikan pelancaran teknologi seolah-olah masalah sudah selesai. Ukur kejayaan pada bantuan yang sampai, bukan sistem yang dipamerkan.

DI HUJUNG SETIAP FAIL ADA MANUSIA

Permohonan zakat bukan sekadar nombor dalam skrin. Di hujung setiap fail ada sebuah rumah, seorang ibu dan anak yang menunggu.

Bagi orang yang lapar, sehari terasa panjang. Bagi keluarga yang hampir kehilangan tempat tinggal, mesyuarat berikutnya mungkin sudah terlambat.

Zakat bukan wang yang patut tidur dalam akaun. Ia hak yang mesti sampai kepada mereka yang telah ditentukan.

PROPAZ juga perlu dinilai dengan jujur. Menurut titah, selepas 17 tahun, hanya 244 asnaf berjaya berdikari, sekitar 15 orang setahun.

Titah turut membandingkan pencapaian itu dengan lebih 14,000 asnaf fakir dan miskin. Jika cara lama tidak berhasil, carilah jalan baharu.

Bekerjasamalah dengan sektor swasta, institusi pendidikan dan masyarakat. Mengakui kekurangan ialah langkah pertama untuk mencari penyelesaian yang lebih baik.

EMPAT BULAN UNTUK MEMBUKTIKAN PERUBAHAN

Baginda mahukan hasil dalam kadar segera. MUIB, KHEU dan JUZWAB diberikan empat bulan untuk menyediakan tindakan, sasaran dan pemantauan.

Empat bulan bukan sekadar untuk bermesyuarat, tetapi untuk menghasilkan perubahan yang dapat diukur.

Di penghujung tempoh empat bulan ini, rakyat wajar dapat melihat jawapan yang jelas kepada perkara berikut:

• Jumlah permohonan zakat yang tertunggak, dan tempoh pemprosesan bagi setiap kategori asnaf
  
  
• Pembetulan penyata akaun kumpulan wang zakat bagi tempoh 2013 hingga 2020
  
  
• Tindakan yang diambil terhadap setiap penemuan audit, termasuk isu wang fidyah dan buku resit
  
  
• Sasaran dan pemantauan baharu bagi PROPAZ, berserta kerjasama dengan sektor swasta dan institusi pendidikan
  
  
• Status tindakan susulan, termasuk siasatan sekiranya dimulakan, yang hendaklah dijalankan secara bebas dan telus tanpa dipengaruhi jawatan atau hubungan

Keupayaan kepimpinan mesti dinilai dan diperkukuh jika sasaran yang ditetapkan gagal dicapai.

NDP BERSAMA RAJA DAN RAKYAT

NDP bersedia menyampaikan suara akar umbi dan membantu mencari penyelesaian. Namun, tanggungjawab utama tetap berada pada institusi yang menerima amanah.

Menjunjung titah bukan sekadar melafazkan taat setia. Ia menuntut kerja apabila Raja mengarahkan perubahan.

Pilihannya jelas: meneruskan pendekatan lama atau membuktikan perubahan melalui hasil.

Empat bulan telah diberikan. Gunakan setiap hari untuk membersihkan pengurusan, mempercepatkan bantuan dan memulihkan kepercayaan.

Kenyataan ini dibuat untuk menyokong pelaksanaan titah melalui saluran undang-undang dan pentadbiran yang sah, bukan untuk menimbulkan kebencian terhadap mana-mana institusi atau individu.

Semoga Allah memberkati usaha memperbetulkan amanah ini. Harapan NDP mudah tetapi besar: semoga titah kali ini tidak lagi umpama mencurah air ke daun keladi. Biarlah ia meresap menjadi kesedaran, diterjemahkan sebagai tindakan dan membuahkan keadilan untuk asnaf yang masih menunggu.

Dari Meja Penasihat | KopiTalk with MHO

Four Months to Fix What Years Have Not

Food for Thought

For years, Brunei has reformed, digitalised and questioned its zakat system. Yet familiar weaknesses keep returning. This time, His Majesty has done something different: he started the clock. Four months to show results. When that deadline arrives, the real question is not what was promised — but what actually changed?

KopiTalk LegCo Special Report | 22nd Legislative Council

Reading the Signals. Testing the Delivery.

His Majesty has repeatedly questioned delays and weaknesses in Brunei’s zakat administration. This time, the concern came with something different: a deadline.

By Malai Hassan Othman - KopiTalk with MHO

BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN, 24 August 2026 — Brunei’s long-running struggle to improve zakat administration has entered a markedly different phase.

His Majesty Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Mu'izzaddien Waddaullah has given those responsible four months to demonstrate tangible improvements in a system repeatedly subjected to royal scrutiny.

The significance lies not merely in another royal intervention, but in its escalation: clear targets, action plans, monitoring mechanisms and a deadline for results.

For an institution entrusted with one of Islam’s fundamental obligations, four months is now the measure against which years of attempted reform will be tested.

The intervention followed an unscheduled meeting with the Brunei Islamic Religious Council, MUIB, amid continuing concerns over zakat governance, financial administration and assistance delivery.

His Majesty directed MUIB, the Ministry of Religious Affairs and JUZWAB to reorganise their strategies and establish KPIs, targets and effective monitoring mechanisms.

Technology should also be deployed to strengthen controls, reduce opportunities for irregularities and accelerate assistance to asnaf whose applications should not remain unnecessarily delayed.

The message was difficult to misunderstand. His Majesty reportedly indicated he would continue pursuing the matter and could personally chair meetings while the problems remained unresolved.

That makes this intervention different from the familiar cycle of concern, explanation, proposed reform and another round of questions several months later.

The royal concern did not suddenly emerge this week. The documentary trail shows remarkably similar questions being raised repeatedly over several years.

JUZWAB itself emerged from reform, when the former Zakat Collection and Distribution Division was upgraded into a department on 19 July 2023, carrying expectations of improved administration.

During an unscheduled visit that year, His Majesty examined JUZWAB, whose stated objectives included efficient zakat collection and distribution alongside programmes intended to empower asnaf.

His Majesty subsequently questioned why eligible applicants still waited so long and whether administrators proactively sought vulnerable people instead of waiting for applications to arrive.

Some fakir miskin were waiting extended periods, while certain Al-Gharimin applicants could wait months, even a year, simply to learn whether applications succeeded.

Those questions matter now because they establish something uncomfortable: the central problems confronting administrators in 2026 were already clearly identified three years earlier.

The issue goes further back. During LegCo in March 2025, the Religious Affairs Minister recalled substantial zakat accumulation before the major distribution initiatives beginning around 2009.

He told the Council that substantial zakat funds had accumulated while comparatively few fakir miskin and converts were receiving distributions from the available funds.

His observation went to the heart of zakat administration: retaining available zakat instead of distributing it to people legitimately entitled to receive assistance was wrong.

The history therefore suggests Brunei’s problem has rarely been about whether zakat exists at all, but about how effectively money entrusted for religious purposes reaches intended beneficiaries.

There have been improvements, and fairness requires acknowledging them. Processing times have fallen substantially while digitalisation and administrative restructuring have progressively entered the system.

Yet faster processing alone cannot answer the larger governance question when recurring weaknesses continue returning to the attention of the country’s highest authority.

His Majesty’s July 2025 intervention provided another unmistakable warning. He questioned why assessment should take months when officers could verify applicants’ circumstances directly with village leaders.

“Kenapa mesti berbulan? Bertahun?” — why should it take months, years? — captured the administrative problem more effectively than pages of procedural explanation.

The criticism was particularly consequential because zakat is not conventional public expenditure. It represents money collected and administered under a specific religious obligation and sacred trust.

That distinction raises the standard expected of its custodians. Efficiency matters, though integrity, traceability, accountability and confidence that every dollar reaches legitimate purposes matter just as much.

The latest royal intervention suggests those questions have moved beyond administrative efficiency into something more fundamental: whether existing governance arrangements are sufficiently robust.

Concerns reportedly included irregular financial statements, fidyah collections kept without proper receipts or banking records, and weaknesses involving the control of zakat property receipt books.

These are materially different from complaints about slow paperwork. They concern the controls protecting money that Muslims have entrusted to an institution as religious obligation.

The issue therefore cannot be reduced to whether one department needs more officers, another computer system, revised forms or another committee examining existing procedures.

MUIB carries statutory responsibility for the administration of zakat, wakaf and Baitulmal, while JUZWAB handles important operational functions. His Majesty emphasised that responsibility cannot simply migrate downwards.

JUZWAB may administer operations, but governance requires those above it to know what is happening, identify irregularities and intervene before weaknesses become royal concerns.

That is perhaps the mild but unavoidable observation emerging from this episode: institutions rarely need this many reforms before implementation itself becomes the issue.

Technology has repeatedly been identified as part of the solution, yet it cannot compensate for unclear ownership, weak controls, slow decisions or inadequate management supervision.

A digital system can identify an application waiting 100 days. It cannot explain why responsible officers allowed the application to remain there for 100 days.

The same distinction applies to empowerment. Zakat should not merely sustain poverty more efficiently; properly administered, it should help recipients progressively escape dependency where circumstances permit.

That makes His Majesty’s concern over PROPAZ particularly significant. After 17 years, only 244 participants were reportedly successfully moved towards greater independence.

Set against more than 14,000 asnaf fakir dan miskin, that figure raises legitimate questions about scale, programme design, targeting and what administrators define as successful empowerment.

Not every recipient can become financially independent. Age, disability, family circumstances and employability differ, making simplistic graduation targets both unrealistic and potentially unjust.

But seventeen years provides sufficient time to ask whether the programme’s architecture matches the scale and complexity of the problem it was designed to address.

This is where the latest development connects directly with issues raised throughout the Second Meeting of the 22nd Legislative Council: delivery, accountability and measurable outcomes.

Across housing, employment, poverty, youth development, civil-service productivity and social protection, essentially the same governance question repeatedly surfaced beneath different ministerial portfolios.

Brunei does not suffer from an absence of policies, programmes, committees or aspirations. Increasingly, the question is whether implementation moves with comparable urgency.

Zakat brings that question unusually close to ordinary lives because administrative delay is experienced differently by somebody waiting for food, rent or emergency household assistance.

A person needing immediate help does not experience a 90-day processing period as an administrative statistic. He experiences ninety mornings of uncertainty.

This is why His Majesty’s four-month deadline may become more consequential than another restructuring exercise or announcement of another technological platform.

It converts reform from an aspiration into something measurable. Four months provides administrators with a date against which the public can reasonably expect evidence of change.

The deadline also changes the accountability equation. Once targets, KPIs and monitoring mechanisms are required, explanations become less important than demonstrable outcomes.

There should consequently be no ambiguity about what success looks like: shorter waiting times, cleaner financial controls, traceable transactions, fewer unresolved applications and stronger asnaf outcomes.

The Government also has an opportunity to publish enough performance information to demonstrate progress without compromising applicants’ privacy or the confidentiality required by religious administration.

Transparency need not mean exposing individual recipients. It can mean reporting processing times, applications received and resolved, disbursements, outstanding cases and empowerment outcomes.

Such disclosure would help rebuild confidence while allowing MUIB itself to demonstrate that the four-month instruction produced more than another internal administrative response.

Public frustration should not automatically be treated as proof of wrongdoing. Social-media allegations remain allegations unless established through audits, investigations or official findings.

But public confidence matters because zakat depends upon trust between those fulfilling their religious obligation, institutions administering it and vulnerable people expecting equitable distribution.

That trust is difficult to strengthen when essentially similar questions repeatedly return to the national conversation despite restructurings, digital initiatives and previous royal interventions.

His Majesty has now shifted the conversation from identifying weaknesses towards demanding results within a specified period.

The chronology speaks for itself. In 2023, questions were asked. In 2025, the delays were questioned again.

In 2026, shortcomings remain — but this time the clock has started.

Four months is not long enough to solve every structural problem surrounding poverty, welfare dependency or asnaf empowerment.

It is, however, long enough to demonstrate whether institutions can establish accountability, repair controls, clear avoidable bottlenecks and show measurable movement when urgency becomes unavoidable.

For Brunei, this is more than another test of administrative reform. Zakat occupies the intersection of governance, social justice, religious obligation and MIB.

And for the asnaf waiting at the other end of the system, the ultimate measure will not be another committee, strategy or presentation.

It will be whether help arrives when help is needed.