When Does Studying Become Deciding?

Food for Thought

For more than a decade, Brunei studies have revisited school runs, working hours and productivity. The problem is known. Options have been examined. Evidence keeps growing. Yet families keep adjusting while decisions wait. Perhaps the harder question is no longer what can be done — but when studying finally becomes deciding.

KopiTalk LegCo Tracker · 22nd Session — Special Report (Decision-Making)

Brunei has spent more than a decade researching the same collision between working hours, school runs and public-sector productivity. The question is no longer whether the problem is understood, but how effectively that knowledge travels from research into decision.

By Malai Hassan Othman

Brunei does not appear to have a shortage of studies into the daily collision between working hours, school runs, traffic and public-sector productivity. It has studied the problem, reviewed solutions and gathered data.

Yet years later, familiar questions keep returning to the Legislative Council. That raises a larger issue than flexible hours or school buses: when does careful policymaking become prolonged indecision?

The problem itself is hardly new.

In 2014, Brunei examined it from two directions at once. The government's own Land Transport White Paper found that school-run traffic accounts for almost a fifth of all motorised traffic on the road — a significant contributor to peak-hour congestion. (Land Transport White Paper for Brunei Darussalam)

It proposed a Sustainable Modes of Travel to School Strategy, better public-transport access, an expanded National School Bus system and school-specific travel planning. (Land Transport White Paper for Brunei Darussalam)

The same year, the 11th Executive Development Programme for Senior Government Officials, run through the Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, examined how to improve the effectiveness of school bus systems. (SHHBIDSS)

The problem, in other words, was already recognised. So were possible responses.

Four years later, the pattern repeated. The 14th Executive Development Programme separately examined inflexibility around working hours in the government sector, and the efficiency of the bus system for primary and secondary public schools. (SHHBIDSS)

Academic researchers reached similar territory the same year. Universiti Teknologi Brunei researchers described heavy congestion outside schools and Brunei's unusual midday traffic peaks, driven partly by parents collecting children. (Universiti Teknologi Brunei)

Their research noted one peak when people left work for lunch and school collection, followed by another as workers returned and children travelled to religious schools. The study cited data indicating up to 80 per cent of children travelled to school by private car, against roughly 10 per cent by school bus. (Universiti Teknologi Brunei)

Different institutions. Different methods. Much the same underlying problem.

The theme resurfaced again the following decade, when independent research began asking not just how to move children to school, but what the daily routine costs the parents managing it.

In 2025, the Centre for Strategic and Policy Studies put faces to that research. In its Volume 12 study of women in the Brunei workforce, one respondent, Violet, said her husband's workplace is only minutes from their children's school — but because his job is not flexible, she does the school runs herself, and it becomes considerably harder when he travels overseas for work. (Centre for Strategic and Policy Studies)

Violet also described her own employer as strict about the time she needs for those runs. Another respondent, Lily, said what would help most is supervised school buses, calling the daily routine of several children, different schools and different finishing times a "nightmare." (Centre for Strategic and Policy Studies)

That is what inflexibility looks like inside two households. The policy question is what happens when the same pattern repeats across thousands of families.

By March 2026, the question had reached the Legislative Council directly. In Council, the Minister at the Prime Minister's Office and Second Minister of Defence told Members the Public Service Department was collecting attendance and office-departure data from civil servants over three months, from January to March — specifically to examine the integrated school system's impact on public-service productivity. (Council of Brunei)

That is sensible administrative work. Policy affecting thousands of workers should not be changed casually, and operations, accessibility and productivity all deserve protection during any transition.

But there is another legitimate question: how much evidence is enough? While Government studies the consequences of changing the system, comparatively little public attention appears focused on the economic consequences of not changing it.

At midday, a working parent leaves the office — not necessarily for lunch. School has finished, and someone has to collect the children.

The parent drives to school, joins other vehicles doing much the same thing, collects the children and returns to work. Tomorrow, the journey repeats.

Multiply that routine across Government departments, private businesses, schools and thousands of households, and an individual family arrangement becomes part of Brunei's transport system — and potentially part of its productivity problem.

Government is right to ask whether flexible working could affect productivity. But the same test should be applied to the status quo.

How many paid working hours are consumed by school runs? How much fuel is burned, and how much congestion does the pattern impose on other road users?

What does repeated departure and re-entry during working hours do to workflow, meetings, supervision and public-service delivery — and what does it cost employers?

These are not arguments for immediately imposing flexible hours or putting every schoolchild onto a bus. They are questions about opportunity cost. Every policy change has a price. So does leaving things unchanged.

Yet no credible public estimate appears readily available showing what school-run disruption costs Brunei annually in lost productive time. Without sufficient data, putting a BND figure on that loss would be speculation.

But the absence of a number raises its own question: if productivity is central to deciding whether working arrangements should change, has Government calculated the productivity cost of keeping them as they are?

There may be another reason progress is difficult: the issue does not fit neatly inside one ministry. Working hours concern the public service; schools fall under education; congestion involves transport authorities.

School buses involve operators, regulation, safety, financing and parents. Work-life balance crosses employment and social policy. Productivity touches practically everybody.

Each agency may therefore be addressing a legitimate piece of the problem without any single institution owning the entire outcome. That is where coordination becomes as important as research.

Government deserves some fairness here. Changing working arrangements across the civil service is more complicated than shifting a clock, and different agencies have genuinely different operational requirements.

Hospitals cannot organise work like administrative offices. Public-facing counters cannot simply become unavailable because employees choose different schedules. School buses raise their own legitimate questions about safety, routes and cost.

These require careful answers. But caution and inertia are not the same thing. The distinction lies in whether study leads towards a defined decision — or merely towards another study.

That is why this issue now matters beyond the school gate. The school run is not Brunei's biggest national problem — which may be precisely why it makes such a useful test.

Brunei faces much harder decisions before 2035: economic diversification, human-capital development, digital transformation, food security, public-service reform and declining hydrocarbon dependence. Those ambitions require decisions, not just good policy design — and they require execution.

LegCo discussions have increasingly highlighted the gap between policy and public experience, including calls for stronger accountability and more responsive public-service delivery. (Council of Brunei)

The issue, therefore, is not whether Brunei conducts enough research. Research is essential, and consultation is not the enemy of progress. The danger comes when process becomes comfortable enough to substitute for decision.

There is no responsible argument for Government simply to rush. But neither should prudence become an indefinite holding position.

Twelve years now separate that first 2014 school-bus study from the productivity data JPA disclosed to LegCo in 2026 — different institutions, different years, different research exercises, yet remarkably similar questions keep resurfacing.

These were Executive Development Programme research projects and independent academic and think-tank studies, not necessarily formal Cabinet-commissioned policy reviews — a distinction worth keeping honest. What they legitimately establish is something subtler: this problem has circulated inside Brunei's senior-government research and policy environment for well over a decade.

During those years, parents kept driving. Workers kept leaving offices. Traffic kept gathering around schools. More research followed.

The latest LegCo discussions leave Brunei with a question larger than whether civil servants should receive flexible working hours: how effectively does accumulated knowledge travel from research, review and parliamentary discussion into an actual decision?

Perhaps another study will produce better evidence. Perhaps a pilot will reduce the risks. Further consultation may uncover a better solution. All of that may be worthwhile.

But somewhere between studying a problem and solving it lies a decision. Brunei's challenge may increasingly be not knowing what is possible, but developing the institutional resolve to decide what should be done — and then doing it.

That is the delivery test the school run places quietly before Government. And with 2035 less than a decade away, the costliest decision may eventually be the one that takes too long to make.

Bringing Silent Wells Back to Life — But Can Brunei Restore Confidence?

BSP’s production-restoration campaign with SLB could extend mature offshore fields. Its national legacy will be measured through production, Bruneian capability, local business and public confidence.

By Malai Hassan Othman | KopiTalk with MHO

Recently, I asked a bright young Bruneian engineer what was happening inside the oil and gas industry, particularly at Brunei Shell Petroleum.

It was the sort of informal question journalists ask when they want information from the ground, beyond official statements, statistics and corporate presentations.

Once, he said, he followed almost every industry development. He examined announcements, listened for signals and tried to understand what each move meant.

Not anymore.

“I just can’t be bothered,” he said, with a casualness that made the answer more striking than an angry complaint might have been.

He had heard BSP was considering significant ideas about where it should be in another 10, 20 or perhaps 30 years.

Previously, he would have tried to read between the lines. Now, after years of restructuring and cost restraint, his curiosity had faded.

His remarks were not an attack on BSP or SLB. They revealed something quieter: uncertainty about where young Bruneians fit within the industry’s next chapter.

That question became more timely this week when SLB announced a contract from BSP to restore production from shut-in wells across several mature offshore fields.

The 18 August announcement described an integrated campaign covering subsurface evaluation, candidate selection, engineering, offshore intervention, monitoring, metering, project management and marine logistics.

It is the first deployment of SLB’s integrated production-restoration solution for BSP, the longstanding venture owned equally by Shell and Brunei’s Government.

The commercial logic is clear. Restoring viable wells can recover additional production while using platforms, pipelines and facilities already built and operating offshore.

For mature fields, this can be faster and less capital-intensive than relying entirely upon complicated new developments, although every well presents different economics and risks.

SLB said the coordinated model would help increase recovery from existing infrastructure and support BSP’s longer-term production objectives safely and efficiently.

However, neither company has publicly disclosed the contract value, project duration, number of candidate wells or the additional production being targeted.

No public figure has been provided for Bruneian employment, local-company participation, training placements or the proportion of contract value expected to remain domestically.

Those omissions do not mean such commitments are absent. They mean the programme’s broader national contribution cannot yet be measured from the announcement alone.

More Than a Corporate Award

For SLB, the award demonstrates its integrated production capability. For BSP, it offers another route to recover value from fields producing for generations.

For Brunei, the stakes extend beyond the two companies. Oil and gas production continues to influence economic growth, exports, public revenue and household security.

Official figures show how quickly production movements reach the wider economy. Brunei’s economy grew by only 0.7 per cent during 2025.

That growth was primarily supported by stronger oil and gas performance, while the non-oil and gas sector contracted by 0.8 per cent in real terms.

During the fourth quarter, oil and gas output expanded strongly after maintenance ended and newly commissioned wells contributed additional production, according to official reporting.

Crude production reached 114,500 barrels daily, compared with 104,900 a year earlier. Natural gas production rose from 26.7 million to 29.4 million cubic metres daily.

The quarter’s oil and gas sector expanded by 10.1 per cent, helping lift overall economic growth to 4.5 per cent during that period.

The numbers underline a stubborn national reality. When hydrocarbon production rises, Brunei’s economy usually feels it. When output falters, the consequences travel beyond Seria.

AMRO has estimated that upstream oil and gas still accounts for roughly three-quarters of Brunei’s exports and government revenue, despite years of diversification efforts.

This dependence does not weaken the case for production restoration. It makes the way Brunei uses any additional production—and the time it provides—more important.

A Moment of Opportunity

The contract follows an exceptional period for Brunei’s crude exports during global energy disruption and sharp movements in international oil prices.

The Diplomat, citing commodity-tracking company Kpler, reported Brunei exported an estimated 105,000 barrels daily in April, its highest export level for five years.

Nearly 70 per cent reportedly went to Thailand, where refiners sought alternatives as disruption around the Strait of Hormuz strained traditional supply routes.

The estimate measured exports rather than production; cargo timing and stored inventories can create differences between the two figures.

Nevertheless, it showed that Brunei’s light, low-sulphur crude retains strategic value, particularly when refiners require products suitable for aviation and other higher-value fuels.

The online reaction offered a revealing, although limited, glimpse of questions circulating among some Bruneians. The discussion did not reject higher production or commercially sensible recovery efforts.

Instead, contributors asked how long favourable conditions could last, whether the returns would reach national development and what would happen after production declined.

One question captured the anxiety plainly: how long can this last, and when it is gone, what comes next?

Anonymous comments cannot establish facts about company budgets, government expenditure or contracting decisions. They can, however, illuminate questions circulating among ordinary Bruneians.

Those questions echoed the young engineer’s detachment: oil and gas still matters deeply, but its future direction can feel distant from ordinary Bruneians.

The Employment Test

Production restoration requires specialised expertise. Subsurface analysis, well intervention, metering, marine operations and project integration are precisely where high-value technical capability is developed.

SLB is not a newcomer arriving without a local history. Its predecessor performed Brunei’s first well log in 1935, according to the company’s record.

It also has a recognised international record of training national workforces and building technical expertise across the countries where it operates.

The issue, therefore, is not whether SLB has contributed to Brunei. The stronger question is how this contract can deepen that contribution.

Could Bruneian engineers participate in subsurface evaluation and candidate selection, rather than entering only after the important technical choices have already been made?

Could young specialists receive structured exposure to intervention design, production monitoring and integrated project management under experienced SLB and BSP professionals?

Could local marine, logistics and engineering companies move further along the value chain instead of competing mainly for lower-margin supporting work?

Could the campaign produce certifications, technical attachments and institutional knowledge that remain available after the final restored well returns to production?

These are not demands for localisation at the expense of competence. They concern how competence is transferred, expanded and eventually led by Bruneians.

Brunei’s 2018 industry directive established an ultimate objective of 90 per cent Bruneian participation across organisational levels and specialised skill pools.

BSP says its Bruneian workforce increased from 75 per cent in 2009 to 89 per cent by February 2022, reflecting substantial progress towards that objective.

The next measurement should not rest on percentages alone. It should examine who holds technical authority, manages complex projects and makes high-value engineering decisions.

That is where the production-restoration campaign could leave a legacy extending beyond the additional barrels or cubic metres eventually recovered.

Prudence and Confidence

The young engineer remembered experienced personnel leaving through early-retirement and separation exercises, sometimes accompanied by attractive financial packages.

He also remembered repeated cost reductions presented as necessary prudence. Management may regard such measures as essential within a mature and volatile industry.

On the ground, however, the same decisions can be experienced differently—as contraction, reduced career certainty and another reason not to become emotionally invested.

That does not make commercial prudence wrong. Offshore production is expensive, mature assets become harder to manage and oil prices remain vulnerable to sudden shocks.

But cost discipline carries a human dimension. When maintained too long without a convincing forward narrative, prudence can begin to resemble managed decline.

This may be the larger communication challenge facing BSP as it considers where the business should stand over the coming two or three decades.

Young engineers do not need promises that every existing role will remain unchanged. They need an honest picture of which capabilities the future industry will require.

They also need to see pathways into those capabilities—not only graduate recruitment campaigns, but visible progression into technical leadership and commercial decision-making.

What Should Be Disclosed

BSP and SLB could strengthen public understanding by explaining the programme’s national dimensions once commercial and operational sensitivities permit greater disclosure.

The useful measures would include candidate-well numbers, project duration, production objectives, Bruneian participation, training commitments, local procurement and knowledge-transfer arrangements.

Not every commercial detail can be published. But enough can be disclosed to show how a nationally important resource programme creates value beyond corporate production.

That would also help distinguish new employment from redeployment, genuine capability transfer from attendance, and local enterprise development from ordinary subcontracting expenditure.

The questions are neither anti-BSP nor anti-SLB. They arise because both companies occupy an important position in Brunei’s economy and industrial development.

SLB brings technology, global experience and integrated execution. BSP brings the assets, national partnership and responsibility for sustaining a business central to Brunei’s prosperity.

The restoration programme offers both organisations an opportunity to demonstrate that mature fields can still produce fresh national value, not merely additional hydrocarbons.

Restoring More Than Production

Brunei should welcome technically and commercially sound efforts to recover more from resources already discovered, particularly where existing infrastructure can be used efficiently.

Every restored well could support exports, government revenue, downstream supply and economic stability. It could also buy Brunei more time to diversify successfully.

But time bought is not the same as transformation achieved. Additional production becomes a national dividend only when its proceeds and capabilities prepare Brunei for tomorrow.

The young engineer’s indifference should therefore not be dismissed as laziness or cynicism. It may be an early signal worth hearing before disengagement becomes normal.

Brunei’s engineers once watched every industry move because they believed those decisions carried their careers, communities and country towards a more secure future.

BSP and SLB now have an opportunity to make silent wells flow again. The greater achievement would be giving Bruneians reason to care again.

Principal sources

• SLB, “SLB to Support Offshore Production Restoration for Brunei Shell Petroleum”, 18 August 2026.
  
  
• Department of Economic Planning and Statistics, Brunei Darussalam Key Economic Developments: Q4 and Annual 2025.
  
  
• Department of Economic Planning and Statistics, Brunei Darussalam Key Indicators 2025.
  
  
• Ministry of Energy, Directive on Bruneianisation in the Oil and Gas Industry No. 1/2018.
  
  
• Brunei Shell Petroleum, careers and People Strategy information.
  
  
• SLB corporate history, 1930s milestones.
  
  
• AMRO, commentary on Brunei’s economic dependence and mature upstream sector.
  
  
• The Diplomat, “Brunei Pumps More Oil”, 18 June 2026, and associated public discussion on r/nasikatok.

When Mum Can No Longer Be Left Alone

Food for Thought

Brunei’s ageing parents belong with their families. But love and responsibility alone cannot provide nursing, rehabilitation or endless hours of care. As LegCo confronts an ageing society, perhaps the real question is not who should care for Mum — but who will help the family when Mum can no longer be left alone?

KopiTalk LegCo Tracker · Second Meeting — Special Report (Ageing & Care)

Brunei is ageing faster than once assumed, and this LegCo session put elderly welfare back on the record. The question is no longer simply how many elderly Bruneians there will be, but whether families will have enough support to care for them.

By Malai Hassan Othman

Brunei has known for some time that it is ageing.

In its closing remarks summarising this Second Meeting's debates, the Legislative Council listed the welfare of the elderly — kesejahteraan warga emas — among the issues Members had raised.

The harder question the summary left open is more immediate: who will provide the care as more Bruneians grow old?

By 2050, nearly 29 per cent of Brunei's population is projected to be over 60 — 28.7 per cent, according to Brunei's own assessment submitted to the World Health Organisation's Age-Friendly Communities programme, up from around 14 per cent by 2028.

That demographic change will eventually be felt not only in hospitals, pensions and welfare budgets. It will arrive quietly inside ordinary Bruneian homes.

The difficult moment may come when Mum survives a stroke, receives treatment and is eventually considered well enough to leave hospital.

She is home.

But she cannot be left alone.

She may need help bathing, eating and moving. There are medicines to manage, appointments to attend and rehabilitation exercises to continue.

Her children have families of their own.

They also have jobs.

That is where an ageing statistic becomes a family question — and where Brunei's own care system deserves closer examination.

Much of Brunei's geriatric care today still runs through hospitals rather than dedicated elder-care infrastructure — a pattern common to health systems still building specialised elderly-care manpower and services.

The Bridge Between Hospital and Home

In Council, Minister of Health Yang Berhormat Dato Seri Setia Dr Haji Mohammad Isham bin Haji Jaafar outlined plans involving the Tutong hospital.

The extension building of its National Isolation Centre is planned for conversion into a rehabilitation centre, or step-down hospital, alongside several other healthcare facilities.

The project remains at the planning stage.

It was not raised in Council specifically as an elderly-care initiative.

But a step-down hospital is precisely the kind of bridge relevant here: for patients who no longer require acute hospital treatment but are not yet ready to manage safely at home.

Tutong also appears in Brunei's ageing landscape for another reason.

The World Health Organisation's Age-Friendly Communities programme selected the district as Brunei's pilot site, examining accessibility, safety and ease of movement for older residents, including transport and footpaths.

That points towards a familiar formula in social policy: shared responsibility involving Government, families, communities and other sectors.

On paper, that makes sense.

In practice, much of that partnership may already be operating quietly and largely unpaid — inside the family home.

When Hospital Care Ends

Hospitals treat illness.

Families often deal with what happens afterwards.

For an elderly stroke survivor, discharge does not necessarily mean recovery. It can simply mark the point when much of the responsibility moves from hospital to home.

Someone must prepare meals, supervise medication, help with bathing, arrange transport, accompany Mum to appointments and watch for another medical emergency.

That someone is usually a son, daughter, spouse or another relative.

The principle of family responsibility itself is hardly controversial in Brunei.

Within Islam and Malay culture, caring for ageing parents is deeply embedded in filial responsibility, respect and obligation. Brunei's MIB environment reinforces rather than diminishes that expectation.

The policy question therefore should not become whether families should care for their elderly.

That responsibility is already deeply understood.

The harder question is whether families will have enough support to continue fulfilling it as elderly care becomes longer, more complex and more demanding.

The Worker Government Also Needs

There is an uncomfortable demographic paradox here.

Brunei needs productive workers.

An ageing Brunei will also need more caregivers.

Increasingly, they may be the same people.

The daughter caring for an elderly mother may also be the employee Government and industry want participating fully in the workforce.

The son repeatedly taking his father to medical appointments may simultaneously be a supervisor, technician, teacher, civil servant or business owner.

Neither responsibility disappears because the other exists.

This is where elderly-care policy begins to overlap with manpower and productivity policy.

The cost of ageing therefore cannot be measured only through healthcare expenditure.

Some of it may eventually appear as working hours reduced, leave taken, careers interrupted and family members quietly reorganising their lives around care.

Much of that contribution is unpaid.

Much of it barely appears in conventional economic statistics.

Family Care Does Not Mean Family Care Alone

This distinction is particularly important in Brunei.

Residential elderly care exists, but it has never become the country's dominant model.

Seria is home to Brunei's only old persons' home, a longstanding exception within a much stronger social norm that elderly parents remain with their families wherever circumstances allow.

Its existence should not turn this discussion into an argument for institutionalising elderly Bruneians.

Nor should an ageing society automatically mean building more old persons' homes.

The more relevant question is what support should exist between hospital and home.

That space can be considerable.

An elderly person may no longer require hospitalisation but still need nursing assistance, rehabilitation, physiotherapy, supervision or help with everyday activities.

Families provide love, companionship and responsibility.

They cannot automatically provide professional nursing and rehabilitation expertise.

A stronger care system can therefore support family responsibility rather than replace it.

What Ageing Societies Have Learned

Brunei is hardly alone in confronting this problem.

Japan offers a useful comparison. Strong traditions of family responsibility have had to coexist with one of the world's most advanced ageing populations.

Its Community-based Integrated Care System brings medical care, long-term care, prevention, housing and everyday support closer to where elderly people live.

It is designed, where possible, to help people remain within familiar surroundings. Japan also recognises the need to support family caregivers, including those balancing care with employment.

The lesson is not that Brunei should copy Japan.

It is that preserving care within the family may require a support system around the family.

Singapore's Age Well SG similarly emphasises helping seniors remain within their homes and communities while linking housing, transport, active ageing and care.

Malaysia, culturally closer to Brunei, is developing its own long-term-care ecosystem through its National Ageing Blueprint 2025–2045 and Thirteenth Malaysia Plan.

Neither model can simply be transplanted here.

Brunei's population, institutions, resources and MIB framework require a Bruneian solution.

But the underlying point is relevant.

The choice is not simply between looking after Mum at home and sending Mum somewhere else.

There is considerable space between those two extremes.

Sometimes the Carer Needs Care

Denmark offers one particularly useful idea from Europe.

Alongside practical home assistance for elderly people, family caregivers can receive respite or temporary relief when caring responsibilities become difficult to sustain continuously.

The principle is simple: temporary support for the caregiver can help the elderly person continue living at home.

Respite care does not necessarily weaken filial responsibility.

It can help make that responsibility sustainable.

A daughter receiving occasional professional assistance has not abandoned her mother. A son needing several hours' relief from caring for his father has not surrendered responsibility.

Sometimes helping the caregiver is precisely what allows the family to continue caring.

Towards a Bruneian Continuum of Care

None of this means Brunei needs a Japanese, Singaporean, Malaysian or European elderly-care system.

The better question is what a Bruneian continuum of care might eventually look like.

The Tutong step-down hospital could become one part of it.

Home nursing could be another.

So could rehabilitation, physiotherapy, caregiver training, medical transport, community health visits and carefully designed respite support.

Brunei is not entirely starting from zero on the evidence side either.

The Centre for Strategic and Policy Studies, working with the Ministry of Health, is running a National Successful Ageing Survey through 2026.

It is gathering data from 1,100 respondents across all four districts to help build a National Five-Year Roadmap for Successful Ageing.

That baseline could eventually help test whether Brunei's elderly-care system is working — not merely whether programmes and facilities exist.

The objective need not be to move elderly people away from their families.

It could be exactly the opposite:

to help families keep them safely at home for as long as possible.

That distinction matters.

It allows modern elderly-care policy to reinforce the values Brunei wishes to preserve rather than appearing to compete with them.

The Question LegCo Has Put Before Us

Nearly three in every ten Bruneians could be over 60 by 2050.

That future will require more than hospital beds.

It will require geriatric expertise, rehabilitation, community support and perhaps a clearer bridge between acute medical treatment and long-term family care.

Most importantly, it will require recognition that the family caregiver is part of the ageing equation too.

For decades, Brunei's family structure has absorbed much of elderly care without requiring it to be described as a national care system.

Families simply cared.

That principle remains powerful.

But demographic change is making the practical demands behind it harder to ignore.

The success of Brunei's future elderly-care policy therefore need not be measured by how much responsibility Government takes away from families.

A better measure may be how effectively Government enables families to fulfil the responsibility they already accept.

Because when Mum can no longer safely be left alone, her children already understand their responsibility.

What this LegCo session has brought into sharper focus is whether the care system will be ready to help them carry it.

14,677 on Welfare. But How Many Make It Out for Good?

Food for Thought

Brunei knows how many people receive welfare. It knows how many enter training, entrepreneurship and employment programmes. But one number matters more: how many eventually no longer need assistance — and stay independent? Poverty is not solved by giving help. The real measure is when families no longer need it.

KopiTalk LegCo Tracker · Second Meeting — Special Report (Poverty)

Almost 96 per cent of Brunei's welfare recipients are classified as able-bodied. The government wants assistance to lead towards self-reliance. The harder measure is how many households eventually no longer need it.

By Malai Hassan Othman

Brunei has 14,677 people receiving welfare assistance. Of them, 14,079 — or 95.9 per cent — are classified as able-bodied and capable of working.

That figure is striking. But it should not be read as evidence that almost every welfare recipient could simply take a job tomorrow.

Government's own Social Blueprint says poverty is more complicated than physical ability alone. Childcare, transport and wider personal, social and economic circumstances can all affect participation in work.

That distinction matters because poverty returned to the Legislative Council with a different emphasis: not merely how much assistance is distributed, but whether assistance helps people become independent.

Yang Berhormat Pengiran Dato Seri Setia Shamhary bin Pengiran Dato Paduka Haji Mustapha, Minister of Culture, Youth and Sports, set out that direction before LegCo.

Welfare, he said, should support a transition towards employment, entrepreneurship, skills development and ultimately a more self-reliant life.

That moves the poverty debate towards a harder question: how many people actually make that transition — and remain there?

From Assistance to Independence

Government's direction is clear.

The Social Blueprint says empowerment programmes should reduce welfare dependency and strengthen the ability of lower-income individuals and families to support themselves.

Among the initiatives are entrepreneurship and skills-development schemes such as BIBD SEED, alongside employment-matching support involving agencies including Darussalam Enterprise and LiveWIRE Brunei.

The latest LegCo figures show considerable activity behind that policy.

Since 2016, employment matching and employer collaboration have helped 1,037 beneficiaries and family members obtain jobs.

Another 643 people participated in entrepreneurship programmes, while 180 completed skills training through organisations including the Youth Development Centre, LiveWIRE Brunei, DARe and BIBD SEED.

The Visionary Youth Innovation Programme supported 86 children of welfare recipients, with 49 securing employment. Another 246 children benefited from free tuition programmes.

Those are meaningful outputs.

But programme participation, training completion and even initial job placement do not necessarily tell us whether a household has permanently escaped financial vulnerability.

That is where measurement becomes more difficult.

The Missing Number

We know how many people received assistance, how many joined employment and entrepreneurship programmes, and how many were matched to jobs.

What is less visible is another figure: how many subsequently stopped requiring welfare because their household income became sustainably sufficient?

And beyond that, how many remained independent one year later? Two years later?

How many returned after losing work, experiencing illness, assuming caring responsibilities or discovering that their wages still could not meet household needs?

Those figures would tell us something participation statistics cannot.

They would show whether welfare is functioning as a bridge towards independence rather than simply as a safety net people repeatedly return to.

Able to Work, But Facing Barriers

The 95.9 per cent figure will inevitably attract attention.

But the Social Blueprint itself warns against treating poverty as a question of motivation alone.

It identifies childcare and transportation, alongside personal, social and economic circumstances, as practical barriers influencing whether people can participate in employment.

That is an important acknowledgement.

A mother may be able to work but have nobody to care for young children. A job may exist but require transport she cannot reliably afford.

Someone may enter employment but earn too little, work irregular hours or remain exposed to insecure income.

The question is therefore not simply whether somebody can work. It is whether the pathway into work is strong enough to produce lasting household security.

A Job Is Not Always the End of Poverty

This is where poverty and employment policy begin to overlap.

The Social Blueprint warns that informal workers can face inadequate social protection, income inequality and weak job and income security.

That means placing somebody into work does not automatically mean poverty has been resolved.

Someone can technically be employed and remain financially vulnerable.

There lies one of the uncomfortable paradoxes in measuring poverty reduction.

The government may record a successful employment outcome while the same household continues to struggle with food, transport, housing costs, or debt.

A stronger measure would ask what happened afterwards.

Did earnings become sufficient? Was the job retained? Did the household eventually stop requiring assistance?

That is closer to the outcome the Government says it wants.

The Data Is Already There

Brunei is not starting from zero.

The National Welfare System, or SKN, was established in July 2020 to align welfare applications and improve how eligibility is assessed.

The Social Blueprint says SKN can produce poverty mapping covering residence, employment status, education, skills, housing and income of recipients and dependants.

That is a significant capability.

It allows assistance to become more targeted. It should also help Government understand what happens to recipients after interventions are delivered.

If SKN can identify who needs assistance, can it also show who eventually no longer needs it — and why?

That may be the more valuable direction for outcome-based monitoring.

Not surveillance. Not punishment.

Better understanding of whether policies are actually changing lives.

Poverty Beyond the Welfare Register

There is another reason to be cautious about treating the welfare register as Brunei's poverty count.

Some financially vulnerable households may never appear there.

The Social Blueprint cites a BDCB-CSPS study of 1,521 households, in which 24 per cent reported relying on borrowing to meet daily expenses.

It also identifies income inequality as an ongoing social-mobility challenge.

Those households may be employed and may not qualify for assistance. Yet one illness, job loss or unexpected expense could still destabilise the family.

Poverty therefore cannot be understood only by counting people receiving welfare.

The wider issue is economic resilience.

The Strategy Exists. Now Measure the Journey

Government has already built much of the architecture.

The Special Committee on Poverty Issues coordinates policies and interventions, while SKN provides data to support more targeted assistance.

The Poverty Alleviation Action Plan 2026–2029 is expected to emphasise employment pathways, entrepreneurship, family empowerment, targeted interventions and outcome-based monitoring.

The Social Blueprint supplies the wider policy direction: greater self-reliance, resilience and social mobility.

So the question is no longer whether Brunei has a poverty strategy.

It does.

The harder question is whether that strategy can show, clearly and consistently, how many families move out of dependency — and remain there.

There will always be people who require long-term assistance because of disability, illness, age or circumstances beyond their control. A humane welfare system must protect them.

But for those capable of moving towards economic independence, success should eventually become visible in another set of numbers.

Not only how many received assistance.

Not only how many attended programmes.

Not only how many obtained their first job.

But how many households became stable enough that welfare was no longer necessary — and remained stable afterwards.

Brunei already knows how many people need welfare today.

The harder number is how many make it out — and do not need to come back.

They Finished the Programme. Then the Records Went Quiet.

Food for Thought

We trained them. They completed the programmes. Most moved into jobs, education or continued searching. But for 2,348 Bruneians, the official trail went quiet. They may be working. They may not. That uncertainty matters. Perhaps the next employment question is not how many we train — but what happens afterwards?

KopiTalk LegCo Tracker · Second Meeting — Special Report (Employment)

Brunei has invested heavily in preparing local jobseekers for work. Most programme completers remained visible in employment, education or job-search records. But for 2,348 people, an important question remains: what happened next?

By Malai Hassan Othman

There are 2,348 Bruneians in the latest employment figures who deserve another look.

They completed Government workforce-development programmes designed to improve their employability. But afterwards, their trail through the official records cited in the Legislative Council went quiet.

They should not automatically be described as unemployed or inactive. Hansard establishes something narrower — and perhaps more interesting.

Since 2017, the Manpower Planning and Employment Council has introduced 17 Manpower Development Programmes, covering areas such as HSSE, accounting, human resources, and Allied Health.

By 30 June 2026, 16,158 Bruneians had participated: 15,230 jobseekers and 928 already employed.

Among the jobseekers, 13,839 had completed their programmes while another 1,391 were still undergoing training.

Then comes the more revealing breakdown.

Of the 13,839 who completed their programmes, 8,290 — 60 per cent — had obtained employment.

Another 317, or two per cent, were pursuing higher education, while 2,884, or 21 per cent, remained actively looking for work through JobCentre Brunei.

That left 2,348 people — 17 per cent of those who completed the programmes — outside those three clearly identified outcomes.

They had no recent employment record with the Employees Trust Fund, no recent JobCentre Brunei job-search record and no current record through the education channels checked.

The official data could therefore tell us where most programme completers went.

For these 2,348, it could not.

There could be many explanations. Some may have become self-employed, entered gig or informal work, assumed family responsibilities or simply stopped registering as active jobseekers.

But these are possibilities, not findings from the Hansard. And therein lies the more important employment question.

Government knows they entered the programmes. It knows they completed them. What the figures presented to LegCo cannot clearly tell us is what happened afterwards.

That is an awkward gap in a manpower system increasingly being asked to measure not merely training and placement, but retention, productivity, income and sustainable careers.

A person can complete a course without finding work. Someone can find work but leave several months later. Another may accept employment unrelated to the training received.

Yang Berhormat Dato Seri Setia Awang Haji Ahmaddin bin Haji Abdul Rahman, Coordinating Minister for Social Policies and Manpower, told Council that success should not be measured simply by the percentage of locals employed.

It should also consider placement and retention, skills, productivity, income and the number of Bruneians building sustainable careers in the country's key sectors.

That is a considerably more useful measure.

The question is no longer simply: Did we train them?

It becomes: Where did that training eventually take them?

Government programmes understandably measure participation: how many registered, completed the programme and obtained employment. Those numbers are necessary, but the more difficult measurement begins afterwards.

Where is that person one year later — still employed, earning more, building a career, working in the field for which he or she trained, or back looking for work?

Those answers tell us something programme-completion figures cannot.

They tell us whether an intervention changed someone's economic position rather than simply moving that person successfully through a training programme.

The difference is important.

A programme measures what Government delivered.

An outcome measures what changed for the person.

There is an interesting parallel elsewhere in the same LegCo proceedings.

Government is already bringing information from several agencies together through the Sistem Kebajikan Negara to identify households that may fall between welfare programmes.

The system incorporates information involving JAPEM, Zakat and Baitulmal authorities, the Ministry of Education and the Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Foundation.

Employment policy may benefit from the same thinking.

This need not mean greater surveillance of jobseekers.

It means understanding whether someone who leaves one database has moved successfully into economic activity — or simply fallen beyond the measurements being used.

The distinction matters.

A young Bruneian who becomes self-employed and another who becomes discouraged and stops searching could both appear similarly absent from the records cited.

Their circumstances could hardly be more different.

There may be a straightforward way to find out.

Take a representative sample of the 2,348 and follow up.

Where are they now?

Did the training help them obtain work?

If they found employment, did they stay?

If they left, why?

Was salary the problem? Transport? Working conditions? Family responsibilities? Skills mismatch? Or was the programme itself insufficiently connected to available jobs?

Perhaps many are doing well outside the records examined.

That would be useful to know.

Perhaps others encountered barriers that another training course alone will not solve.

That would be even more important to know.

Either answer would make future manpower planning better informed.

Understanding these 2,348 matters even more in the private sector, where 82,013 of 148,129 workers in 2025 were foreign workers.

The government has cautioned that those jobs cannot simply be replaced one-for-one by locals. Skills, suitability, job quality, workforce readiness and industry's actual requirements all matter.

And there lies another paradox: Brunei needs more locals in the private sector, yet for 2,348 Bruneians already put through workforce-development programmes, the available records cannot clearly tell us what came next.

They had already entered the workforce-development system.

Government invested resources in preparing them. They invested their own time and effort in completing the programmes.

For most programme completers, the records presented to LegCo identified what came next.

For 2,348, they did not.

They should not remain merely the 17 per cent at the bottom of a statistical breakdown.

Perhaps the next useful step in manpower planning begins with a simple question:

We trained you. What happened next?

Day Six of LegCo: When Will People Feel the Coordination?

KopiTalk LegCo Tracker · Second Meeting, Day Six — In-Depth (From the Hansard) · 11 August 2026

The Second Meeting ended with Ministers and Members returning to the same unresolved test: not whether Brunei has plans, frameworks and coordinating structures, but whether ordinary people can see the difference in jobs, welfare, projects and public services.

By Malai Hassan Othman

Yang Berhormat Dayang Hajah Safiah binti Sheikh Haji Abd. Salam gave Council one of the clearest tests of the entire Second Meeting, on its sixth and final sitting day.

People will know coordination is working, she said, when business becomes easier, projects finish on time, quality jobs increase, targeted support reaches people when needed, vulnerable groups receive earlier help, and food and energy supplies remain secure.

Decisions must move into action, she went on. Action must produce results. And the people must eventually feel those results.

It was a fitting way for the Second Meeting to end.

Five days earlier, the Council had endorsed His Majesty's appointment of three Coordinating Ministers.

By Tuesday, the discussion had moved beyond the architecture of coordination towards something more difficult to measure — what difference should an ordinary Bruneian actually notice if it works?

The morning answers provided several places to start looking.

Welfare: 14,677 Still Receiving Assistance

One of the strongest disclosures came from Yang Berhormat Pengiran Dato Seri Setia Shamhary bin Pengiran Dato Paduka Haji Mustapha, Menteri Kebudayaan, Belia dan Sukan.

As of the latest figures he presented to Council, 14,677 people remained active welfare recipients.

Of that number, 14,079 — or 95.9 per cent — were categorised as able-bodied and able to work.

That figure immediately raises a difficult question.

If such a large proportion of welfare recipients are considered capable of working, what is keeping so many from moving permanently into employment, enterprise or other forms of economic independence?

YB Shamhary's own answer cautioned against simplistic conclusions.

The government has not imposed a mandatory social contract on all able-bodied recipients, he said, because family responsibilities, personal circumstances and individual capacity differ.

Instead, JAPEM continues to encourage and guide recipients towards empowerment programmes, while the Government studies how the social-contract approach could be strengthened more systematically.

The policy direction is clear: welfare is not supposed to become a permanent destination for those capable of moving beyond it.

YB Shamhary said the emphasis is increasingly on transition pathways into jobs, entrepreneurship and independent living.

There are results.

Since 2016, job-matching initiatives have helped 1,037 recipients and family members obtain employment.

Another 643 recipients participated in entrepreneurship programmes, 180 received skills training, and 49 of 86 participants in the youth-focused PIBB programme secured jobs.

Those figures matter.

But another number would tell us even more:

How many welfare recipients have left assistance permanently — and how many eventually return?

Hansard does not provide that figure.

That may be the next useful measure if the Government wants welfare policy judged by outcomes rather than participation.

Projects: The Causes of Delay Are Already Known

Yang Berhormat Dato Seri Setia Awang Haji Muhammad Juanda bin Haji Abdul Rashid, Menteri Pembangunan, returned to a familiar public frustration — why Government projects and contractor payments can become delayed.

The causes he listed were not mysterious.

Scope changes.

Design changes.

Additional works requiring approval.

Technical requirements that remain incomplete.

Separately, on payment delays specifically, he pointed to contractor claims submitted incorrectly or without the information required for verification.

YB Juanda's response is to strengthen coordination earlier in the project cycle rather than allow unresolved issues to accumulate until completion.

For Government projects, the Project Implementation Manual is used as the standard reference, with progress meetings and staged inspections intended to identify problems before they affect final certification.

That is sensible.

But it also exposes a harder accountability question.

If the causes of delay are already known, how often are the same causes still being repeated from one project to another?

That is where coordination should eventually become measurable.

Not by another meeting being held.

By fewer projects reaching the end of their timetable with the same preventable problems still unresolved.

Water Gives Us a Useful Example

Non-revenue water offers a more concrete model of what measurable delivery can look like.

YB Juanda said Phase 2 of the programme reduced non-revenue water from 45 per cent in 2020 to 32 per cent in 2022, in pilot areas including Lambak Kanan, Tungku, Kilanas, Dadap and Gadong.

Phase 3 began on 2 September 2025 and is scheduled for completion on 1 September 2029.

The new phase includes pressure-control zones, real-time monitoring, replacement of ageing pipes and digital acoustic sensors to detect underground leakage.

This is the sort of policy story that is easier for the public to follow:

There was a problem;

The public may not remember every programme name.

They will notice whether water losses fall and supply becomes more reliable.

Housing Is Also Becoming Greener

The National Housing Scheme resurfaced on Day Six from a different angle.

YB Juanda said newer housing projects are using Industrialised Building Systems and energy-efficient LED lighting, while further options under study include rainwater harvesting, water-saving fittings, solar-powered external lighting and modular or prefabricated construction.

Projects are also being worked towards green-building ratings, including Gold-level certification where technically and financially suitable.

This is a constructive development.

But, as with the wider housing debate earlier in the Meeting, the ultimate public measure will still be practical:

Can houses be built faster?

Can families afford them?

Can the homes remain economical to maintain?

And can they be delivered early enough in people's lives to provide the security the scheme is designed to create?

Young People, AI and the Jobs Ahead

Youth and technology also featured prominently.

YB Shamhary pointed to Bruneian youth achievements in APICTA, BICTA, the Crown Prince CIPTA Award and the AI Ready ASEAN Youth Challenge.

He also highlighted STEAM and AI curricula run by the Ministry of Education, university capstone projects, apprenticeships, digital entrepreneurship programmes and a Bachelor of Digital Science in Applied Artificial Intelligence.

Those initiatives matter because the employment question has hovered over almost every day of this Second Meeting.

The challenge is no longer simply whether young Bruneians are receiving training.

It is whether those skills match real jobs as technology changes the labour market.

Again, the useful measurement comes after the programme ends.

Who finds work, in what field and at what salary?

And how durable is that employment?

From Ministries to Mukim and Kampung

The afternoon adjournment speeches brought the coordination debate closer to ordinary life.

Yang Berhormat Dr Awang Haji Mahali bin Haji Momin warned against a culture of "passing responsibility" between ministries.

Necessary bureaucracy, he said, should not become red tape that slows progress because people want solutions that are quick, clear and effective.

That is perhaps one of the most relatable definitions of whole-of-government reform.

The public does not normally care which department owns which part of a problem.

They care whether somebody owns the solution.

Yang Berhormat Awang Haji Daud bin Jihan pushed the same argument down to mukim and kampung level.

He called for stronger whole-of-government coordination among ministries, departments, local authorities, penghulu and village institutions so residents do not have to deal with too many agencies to solve one issue.

That gives the national coordination debate a very simple grassroots test:

How many doors must someone knock on before one problem gets solved?

If that number falls, people will feel the reform.

Temburong: Development Has to Change Opportunity

Yang Berhormat Haji Awang Sulaiman bin Haji Nasir used Temburong to make another important distinction.

The district has seen significant physical development.

But he argued that development should also create local economic opportunities, employment, tourism activity, education access, entrepreneurship, digital connectivity and greater community participation.

His point was broader than Temburong.

A place can look more developed without the people living there necessarily becoming more economically secure.

He put the wider Wawasan test just as clearly: progress should not be judged only by statistics, indices or frameworks, but by what citizens can see, feel and enjoy in daily life.

That may be the deeper message of Day Six.

The government has become increasingly explicit about measuring outcomes.

Members are now asking that those outcomes be translated into experiences people recognise.

A 'What-To-Do List' for 2035

Yang Berhormat Pehin Orang Kaya Indera Pahlawan Dato Seri Setia Awang Haji Suyoi bin Haji Osman described the Coordinating Ministers' statements as effectively a "what-to-do list" for Wawasan Brunei 2035.

The priorities he cited included human-capital development, stronger social safety nets, future-ready talent, a larger role for communities and grassroots leaders, and stronger policy governance.

That description is useful.

The architecture now exists: Coordinating Ministers, national priorities, KPIs, National Outcomes, sectoral plans and roadmaps.

What remains is implementation.

And several speakers returned repeatedly to the same warning: with less than a decade remaining to 2035, the country no longer has the luxury of treating implementation as tomorrow's problem.

The Meeting Ends. The Measurement Begins.

By late afternoon, the remaining Members had completed their adjournment speeches.

The Speaker called Usul Bilangan 7/2026 — the motion to adjourn the Second Meeting — for the House's agreement.

By show of hands, all Members agreed, and the motion was passed.

The Speaker then formally adjourned the Second Meeting to a date not yet fixed, under Standing Order 35.

That closes the parliamentary record.

It does not close the questions raised inside it.

Brunei now has a clearer coordination structure and increasingly explicit ways of measuring progress.

The harder test begins outside the chamber.

Can businesses move more easily?

Can Government projects finish on time?

Can welfare recipients move into stable work?

Can young people trained for new industries find the jobs those programmes were meant to prepare them for?

Can residents solve everyday problems without being passed from agency to agency?

And can national progress be seen not merely in an index — but in what people actually experience?

Day Six left us with YB Dayang Safiah's own definition of success, echoing back across the whole Meeting.

Decisions become action.

Action produces results.

And eventually, people must feel the difference.

Day Six at a Glance

• Poverty and welfare — YB Shamhary (Menteri Kebudayaan, Belia dan Sukan) said 14,677 people remained active welfare recipients, with 14,079 — 95.9 per cent — classified as able-bodied and able to work. A mandatory social contract is not yet applied universally, but transition pathways into employment, entrepreneurship and self-reliance are being strengthened.

• Employment outcomes — Per YB Shamhary, since 2016 job-matching initiatives have helped 1,037 welfare recipients or family members obtain jobs; 643 joined entrepreneurship programmes; 180 participated in skills training; and 49 of 86 PIBB participants secured employment.

• Project delivery — YB Juanda (Menteri Pembangunan) identified scope and design changes, additional works, incomplete technical requirements and incorrect contractor claims among recurring causes of project and payment delays. Earlier coordination is being emphasised.

• Non-revenue water — YB Juanda said pilot-area water losses fell from 45 per cent in 2020 to 32 per cent in 2022. Phase 3, running from September 2025 to September 2029, uses smart pressure zones, pipe replacement and acoustic leak detection.

• Greener housing — YB Juanda said new National Housing Scheme projects are using IBS construction and LED lighting, while rainwater harvesting, water-saving fittings, solar-powered external lighting and modular construction are under study.

• Youth and AI — YB Shamhary highlighted youth achievements in national and regional technology competitions alongside Ministry of Education STEAM and AI curricula, apprenticeships, startup programmes and applied-AI higher education.

• Grassroots coordination — YB Mahali and YB Daud bin Jihan called for whole-of-government delivery to reach mukim and kampung level so residents are not forced to navigate multiple agencies for one problem.

• Temburong — YB Sulaiman bin Haji Nasir urged development to connect physical infrastructure with jobs, tourism, enterprise, digital access and community participation so local people experience the economic benefit.

• Second Meeting adjourned — Usul Bilangan 7/2026, the motion to adjourn the Second Meeting, was approved by a show of hands before the Speaker formally adjourned the Council to a date not yet fixed under Standing Order 35.