Before blaming Ali Chandran or Ali Bangla, ask a harder question: Who wrote the rules, issued the licences, set the enforcement priorities and measured success? Sometimes the biggest obstacle to local economic participation is not who walked through the door — but who left it open in the first place.
June 2026
Part 3 of the KopiTalk series on local economic participation in Brunei (Read here for Part 1 and Part 2)
Before we ask why Ali Chandran and Ali Bangla thrive, we should ask who wrote the rules they are operating within.
By Malai Hassan Othman
There is a point in every honest conversation when exhaustion sets in.
Not the exhaustion of having nothing left to say. The exhaustion of watching the same argument circle back on itself — louder each time, angrier each cycle, and no closer to the truth that was sitting there from the beginning.
We have reached that point with the Ali Chandran and Ali Bangla debate.
Because here is what the viral rants, WhatsApp forwards and TikTok complaints have consistently failed to ask:
Who wrote the policy?
Who runs the system?
Who issues the licences?
Who sets the enforcement priorities?
Who designs the market spaces?
Who decides what gets monitored and what gets quietly ignored?
The answer is not Ali Chandran.
It is not Ali Bangla.
And yet those are the names being blamed.
Let us be precise about what Ali Chandran and Ali Bangla have actually done.
They entered a market that was open to them. They operated within a licensing system that permitted their participation. They rented licences from locals who offered those licences willingly — for a monthly payment, for a lump sum, for an arrangement that suited both parties at the time.
They read our institutional culture accurately. They understood that some licence holders preferred passive income over active enterprise. They understood that enforcement was inconsistent. They understood that certain corridors of the system were navigable through relationships and familiarity.
They also understood that Bruneian consumers — given a choice — would often queue at the foreign-run food stall, browse the foreign-run retail shop, and hire the foreign contractor, not out of disloyalty, but because the service was consistent, the price was competitive and the experience met expectations.
They did not impose themselves on Brunei.
Brunei invited them in — one licence rental, one customer choice, one hiring decision at a time.
This is the truth that the complaints are designed to avoid.
Because if we acknowledge it fully, the conversation changes entirely.
It stops being about them and starts being about us.
It asks why a local licence holder finds passive rental income more attractive than building his own enterprise. It asks why local cooperatives, designed specifically to build collective economic strength, have too often collapsed into internal disputes and governance failures. It asks why enforcement agencies, staffed and funded by the public, have not developed the institutional intelligence to detect ecosystem-level economic activity rather than individual licence violations.
It asks why the same community that writes economic policy, runs the licensing system and controls the regulatory environment is now expressing surprise — on social media — at the outcome of that policy, that system and that environment.
You cannot write the rules, run the system, leave the door open, and then complain about who walked through it.
There is something else worth saying plainly.
The preference for foreign-run businesses is not something Ali Chandran or Ali Bangla manufactured. They did not create the Bruneian consumer’s inclination toward foreign retail, foreign food and beverage, foreign construction finishes, or foreign professional services.
That inclination existed before they arrived.
They simply positioned themselves to meet it.
Walk through any commercial area in Brunei. Notice where the queues form. Notice which shopfronts are maintained with more consistency. Notice which food stalls run out of stock by midday.
The market is telling us something.
It has been telling us for years.
What it is saying is not that foreign operators are superior. What it is saying is that they took the market seriously — its demands, its expectations, its habits — in a way that local enterprise has not always matched.
That is not a racial observation.
It is a market observation.
And markets do not respond to sentiment.
They respond to behaviour.
None of this means enforcement does not matter.
Licence fronting arrangements must be scrutinised. Labour and immigration rules must be applied consistently. Businesses operating outside the boundaries of the law must be held accountable.
But enforcement alone will not solve this.
Part of the problem is what the system chooses to measure. As long as authorities count the number of licences registered as the measure of entrepreneurship progress, the KPI will always look healthy — even as the reality behind those numbers tells a different story.
A licence registered is not a business built.
A number recorded is not an enterprise functioning.
When we measure inputs instead of outcomes, we will always find reasons to be satisfied with a situation that deserves scrutiny.
The system is counting paperwork and calling it progress.
Because the moment one arrangement is closed, another will open — as long as the underlying conditions remain unchanged. As long as locals find it easier to rent than to build. As long as cooperatives cannot govern themselves with the discipline the market demands. As long as policy continues to reward passivity over enterprise. As long as the system measures licences issued rather than genuine local economic participation.
The door will stay open.
And rational actors will continue to walk through it.
This is not a uniquely Bruneian challenge.
More than a decade ago, Singapore-based advisers warned that many Malay-Muslim businesses faced similar problems: small scale, weak bankability and limited growth potential. Their recommendation was not more slogans or more encouragement, but consolidation, stronger governance, shared manpower, shared infrastructure and institutions capable of scale.
That lesson should feel familiar to Brunei today.
What genuine reform looks like is not complicated to describe, even if it is difficult to execute.
It requires licence holders to be held to the standard of active participation, not nominal ownership.
It requires cooperatives to be governed with the same rigour demanded of any serious commercial entity.
It requires enforcement to develop economic intelligence — the ability to map supply chains, financing networks and labour systems — not just inspect individual shopfronts.
It requires the KPI to change.
Not how many licences were issued — but how many represent genuinely active, locally run enterprises.
Not how many entrepreneurship programmes were conducted — but how many participants built businesses that survived, scaled and employed others.
Measure outcomes.
Not paperwork.
Most of all, genuine reform requires us to stop outsourcing our economic frustration to the people who responded to conditions we created.
Ali Chandran did not write the policy.
Ali Bangla did not run the system.
We did.
And if the outcome is not what we wanted, the reckoning begins there — not on TikTok, not in a WhatsApp group, and not with three fingers pointing outward while we ignore the ones pointing back.
The next piece in this series asks a different question: if ecosystems can be built, why have we struggled to build our own?
KopiTalk with MHO • Malai Hassan Othman
Substack: kopitalkwithmho.substack.com • LinkedIn: Distribution
Part 3 of a continuing series on local economic participation in Brunei.






