PART 3 OF 3
Part one of this series examined why young Bruneians are gambling on Australian farm work. Part two considered the mismatch between what graduates study and the jobs available.
This final part asks the plainest question left: what has close to two decades of effort delivered, and what should happen now?
KopiTalk with MHO
Brunei has spent close to two decades measuring this problem. The latest figures show why the debate has not gone away.
Institutions were built. Whether they have opened enough doors is the fair question still left to answer.
The 2024 Manpower Blueprint records initiatives stretching back to 2009.
That year brought the Employment Order and Workplace Safety and Health Order. JobCentre Brunei and the i-Ready Apprenticeship Programme followed in 2017.
The oil and gas Bruneianisation Directive and i-Usahawan programme arrived in 2018. The Lifelong Learning Centre and Manpower Planning and Employment Council followed in 2019.
Sector committees and SkillsPlus funding appeared in 2020, followed by salary guidelines covering 58 job positions in 2021.
That is sustained institutional activity. The fair question is how much lasting difference it made, who benefited and where the remaining gaps require a different response.
What the Numbers Show
The 2024 Manpower Blueprint puts labour underutilisation between 15.7 and 21.9 per cent during 2017-2021. The 2025 Labour Force Survey reports 16.4 per cent.
The latest figure remains within that earlier range. It indicates a continuing challenge, but does not prove that conditions worsened every year or that every intervention failed.
Labour underutilisation is broader than unemployment. It also captures unmet demand for work beyond those formally classified as unemployed.
The Blueprint also reports that professionals, managers, executives and technicians represented 40 per cent of the local workforce in 2021, down from 45 per cent in 2017.
That is a historical comparison, not a verdict on today's workforce. A falling share does not, by itself, prove that the number of people in those roles fell.
Even with that caution, the policy question remains: are enough opportunities being created for people to use their education, build skills and earn a sustainable living?
The 2025 survey offers another angle. Between 2024 and 2025, informal employment among locals fell from 11,800 to 8,500.
Among non-locals, it rose from 11,400 to 18,200, an increase of approximately 60 per cent. Informal employment describes work arrangements and protections, not entry-level status.
The figures show a marked shift in informal employment. They cannot establish whether non-local recruitment displaced local applicants, filled otherwise unfilled positions or reflected another labour-market change.
Nor does the decline among locals automatically mean lost opportunity. Its significance depends partly on whether those workers moved into more secure employment.
The scrutiny belongs on recruitment practices, working conditions and policy outcomes, without turning foreign workers into targets for frustrations they did not create.
From Measurement to Outcomes
Nobody sets out to be detained at an Australian airport, or exploited on a farm without a safe way to report it.
Such choices may emerge when risk abroad appears more manageable than insecurity at home. This series suggests that insecurity has persisted beyond one difficult year.
Domestic programmes need clearer outcome reporting. Alongside placement totals, publish how many participants remain employed after six and twelve months, what they earn and whether their work uses their training.
Where results fall short, say plainly what will change, who is responsible and when progress will be reviewed.
The desire to work abroad should also be addressed openly and practically. Assess a formal, vetted pathway for Bruneians seeking temporary work overseas.
Any pathway would depend on destination-country rules and cooperation. It would require lawful work authorisation, vetted employers, clear contracts, published earnings after costs and an effective complaints process.
If that assessment supports a pilot, start small. Judge it by participants' actual savings, treatment, skills gained and employment prospects after returning home.
A country does not lose its young people simply to another country's farms. It risks losing them to the accumulated gap between national ambition and opportunities they can reach.
Brunei has spent close to two decades measuring that gap. The test now is whether its programmes can close it.
Some Bruneians will still choose overseas work when worthwhile options exist at home. That can be a legitimate choice, provided the work is lawful and properly protected.
When uncertain work abroad appears more promising than what is available or permitted at home, however, that calculation deserves a practical answer.
Sources: Manpower Blueprint for Brunei Darussalam (2024), including its historical timeline and workforce indicators for 2017-2021; Department of Economic Planning and Statistics, Labour Force Survey 2025, published in 2026, including comparisons with 2024.
KopiTalk with MHO — End of Series

No comments:
Post a Comment